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Abstract
Pluralism presents a troubling epistemic problem in that the inability to determine whether or not
significant portions of a given religion’s cosmological and metaphysical belief set actually
correspond to reality. Within this standstill there seems to be no way to prove yet alone
maximize the epistemic rationality of continued religious practice, as each religion will claim to
have a unique source of knowledge the others do not. However, if we set aside these
unverifiable disputes, there remains an often underemphasized common thread: religions each
have a conception of how this world ought to be. These conceptions involve how members of a
community ought to relate to each other so as to maximize well-being and minimize suffering.
This focus on well-being is a universal aim of living creatures and as such is not the reduction of
distinct religions to a shared essence but is instead a common underlying goal. Well-being will
of course look different in different contexts, and as such this paper will develop a suitably
relativizable yet robust sense of well-being to serve as a manner by which to evaluate religious
practice. Thus, practical rationality at least with respect to this-worldly salvation can be
maximized. But in order to avoid a relativism about the specific beliefs that get one to the
ethical output, an internal coherency constraint will also be applied, secondarily to the ethical
metric. This will help to maintain elements of religiosity and felt experience in the face of the
changes that will be required by a shift in focus to this-worldly salvation. I will examine
Christianity of a Catholic bent in order to look at some of the ways in which a religion’s selfconception will have to change significantly with respect to their relation to salvation if it begins
to understand itself as but one possible path towards it and if it begins to recognize that other
prima facie contradictory religions can be learned from to better accomplish this shared goal.
keywords: this-worldy salvation, liberation theology, well-being, pluralism, relativism
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I. Introduction
The existence of a plurality of religions presents a troubling problem for the full-throated
belief that one’s own religion is uniquely and absolutely true. From an epistemic standpoint,
each religion appears to be on perfectly equal footing with respect to metaphysical and doctrinal
claims about the nature of divine reality. But even if the broader cosmological disputes can’t be
adjudicated, that does not relegate religious practice to the realm of mere armchair philosophy.
Indeed, John Hick (1988) makes the claim that the inability to settle doctrinal disputes about
conceptions of the ultimate, the metaphysical, and the historical do not affect whether or not any
or all of the religions can be salvifically effective (p. 365-369). If we set aside metaphysical
claims, salvation must be understood as this-worldly salvation centered upon the alleviation of
suffering and the promotion of well-being. This definition will be developed in the following
chapter.
There is, in absolute minimum, a pragmatic rationale for viewing religious practice as an
avenue by which ethical praxis can be positively informed. Specifically, for the purposes of this
paper, religious praxis can be seen as a plausible means by which to aid the broader practical aim
of increasing well-being and decreasing suffering. And this aim is a uniquely universal one. I
am by no means claiming a universal essence to religions generally; this universality is prior to
religion. But due in part to that fundamental level of universality, each religion does involve a
rich view of how this world is not as it ought to be (Suchocki, 1987, p. 159). The actualization
of how the world in fact ought to be is the realization of this-world salvation. This involves an
increase in well-being based upon that particular religion’s contextualized version of what wellbeing means. And, if that universal aim is accepted and religion is seen as a rational manner in
which to achieve it, it at least can be practically rational to continue to practice one’s religion in
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the face of pluralism. Of course, in order to be maximally practically rational the religious
praxes must be subject to some sort of evaluative metric and adjusted where necessary to
maximize its salvific efficacy. Developing such an ethical metric will be the task of the next
chapter.
But, if one focuses merely on the practical benefit to well-being, religion runs the risk of
becoming meaninglessly relative in its specifics and thereby being reduced to a roundabout,
inefficient way to achieve something that can be achieved secularly. So, a separate metric must
be developed by which the parts of religious belief and practice that cannot be verified or do not
directly relate to well-being can be evaluated and similarly adjusted for maximal rationality,
secondarily to the ethical metric. This is in attempt to avoid that relativity with respect to the
specific beliefs that get one to the practical output. It is also an attempt at conserving the less
practical aspects of religious practice in the face of the shifts that will be demanded by the ethical
metric. This portion of the project will make up the third chapter.
The need for two separate evaluative metrics comes out of the fact that religion generally
is (at least) dual in nature. There is the part of the religion that deals with the divine and
concomitant beliefs, but there is also the part of religion that “has to do with confronting,
specifying, and then repairing what is wrong with the way human beings live their lives together
in this world” (Knitter, 1995, p. 100). These two halves of religion have distinct evidential bases
as well. The metaphysical beliefs are empirically unverifiable and are thus based in faith and
revelation. The practical half of religion, conversely, is in fact verifiable in that the effects of the
positive ethical output can be seen in increases in well-being and reductions in suffering. This of
course will have to be a coarse-grained verification similar to the utilitarian calculus. But even
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so, it is the only part of religious practice that can be verified. The metaphysical disputes cannot
be adjudicated by appealing to the way things really are.
Such a method of adjudication involves an empirical approach to the world and truth
claims about it that can be summed up by a definition offered by Hilary Putnam of what he calls
metaphysical realism (henceforth MR). MR is comprised of three claims: “(1) that the world
consists of a fixed totality of mind-independent objects, (2) that there is exactly one true and
complete description of the way the world is, and (3) that truth involves some sort of
correspondence” between these objects and descriptions of them (Putnam, 1992, p. 49). Now,
MR is typically the context by which conflicting beliefs are adjudicated, and it is appropriate for
empirical disputes. For example, if someone claims that water is made up of two hydrogen
molecules and one oxygen molecule and someone else claims that water has two of each, there is
a way to settle the dispute. The mind-independent nature of water can be examined and
compared to the two potential descriptions. But there seems to be no similar avenue with regards
to the metaphysical and cosmological beliefs that underpin religions.
Here it will be useful to formalize the epistemic standstill between different religions that
opened this paper. It will help to show the inapplicability of MR as a model for understanding
metaphysical and cosmological religious disputes. Moreover, it will also show that
understanding one’s own religion as true in the MR sense is in large part what motivates
exclusivist stances. Take a hypothetical exchange between, say, a Christian and a Hindu, in the
presence of an impartial observer who has no background in any religion. If the Christian makes
claim A, where A is a description of the cosmos and our role within in according to Christian
doctrine, and the Hindu makes claim B, where B is a description of the cosmos and our role that
is wholly incompatible with A, there seems to be no way in which the observer could determine
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which claim, if either, is true. Neither claim can be demonstrably said to have an epistemic
advantage. Now, given the faith justificatory basis for cosmological beliefs, both disputants take
their claims as justified. But they would not view the other’s claim as equally justified. Faith as
a justificatory base typically involves the further belief that one’s own religion is in some sense
the recipient of a unique source of knowledge. In the case of the pluralist standstill, this unique
source of knowledge justifies one’s own belief such that it appears to oneself to have an
advantage over the other. But to the observer, neither would have an advantage, as each would
claim such a unique source of knowledge at the expense of the other.
But, from the Christian’s perspective, claim A does have a justificatory advantage over
claim B, given that he nonetheless views himself as having access to a source of knowledge not
available to the Hindu. Under MR, if claim A has additional justification and claim B contradicts
it, claim B cannot be true. If the descriptions conflict, they cannot both correspond to the way
reality actually is. Thus, the Christian takes claim A as exclusively true and denies claim B. The
Hindu would take the same logical steps about claim B. But since appeals to unique justificatory
bases are available to all, this application of MR does not succeed in actually delegitimizing any
other religion to which the same moves are available. And there is clearly no empirical method
by which to determine ‘who is right’ with respect to cosmological beliefs. As such, this paper
will set aside these disputes and focus on the things that can in fact be evaluated. That being
said, I do not believe that this sort of epistemic standstill necessitates withholding belief from
any religion because none can be verified. It is not as if this context acts as a defeater for either
the Christian or Hindu belief set as much as presenting a defeater for continued claims of
exclusivism. The reverse of the inability to prove the metaphysical underpinnings of one’s own
religion is that is one is equally unable to disprove those of another.
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This application of MR to beliefs with content that cannot be verified in accordance with
its theses leads to exclusivist mentalities that stymie interfaith discussions. One cannot learn
from or even truly take seriously the religious claims of a member of a different religion if they
view those claims as inherently false. Moreover, it tends towards stagnancy internally as well, in
that the beliefs and practices of one’s own religion are more easily seen as uncriticizable. So,
recognizing that MR does not apply to cosmological religious disputes opens to the door to
possibility of learning from other religions. It also reinforces the possibility that some sort of
reform could even be required, beyond allowing for additional sources of insight. The fourth
chapter of this paper will examine what sorts of reforms ought to occur with respect both to
beliefs and practices and to how a religion views itself and others. The test case for the
application of the norms and standards I am developing will be Christianity of a Catholic bent,
but only because this is the background which I have and the religion about which I can speak
most confidently.
However, in order to get to the point of developing a pluralist Christology, I will first
have to examine ways in which to set up interreligious norms by which a belief, practice, etc. can
be said to be ethically valuable, as well as developing a suitable notion of religious truth claims.
Again, this will not be a static evaluative process. Instead, the standard relation of doctrine and
ethical practice will be inverted. Generally, praxis is thought of as flowing out of and dependent
upon doctrine. But given the doctrinal standstill outlined above, there seems to be no good way
in which to determine best practices if the only metric for goodness is unverifiable
correspondence with unevaluable metaphysical positions. Rather, I will be following Paul F.
Knitter and others in looking at how Christian doctrine can be changed or differently employed
and understood in the context of better achieving our ethical aims, while still retaining as much
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of the heart of the Christian religious experience felt by its practitioners as is possible. This
allows for us to move forward from the pluralist standstill.
This strategy of actively responding and adapting to the problem of religious diversity
runs counter to what Tom F. Driver (1987) calls “strategies of liberal complacency” (p. 208209). As a partial response to pluralism, many in the Christian community have shifted from the
historical perspective of exclusivism in which all other religions are viewed as largely if not
wholly misguided and incorrect to some sort of more positive viewpoint under the assumption
that by so doing, these other religions “can somehow be politely affirmed in their existence
without the need for Christianity to undergo any significant change itself” (Driver, 1987, p. 208).
This takes two general forms. The first is the shift from an exclusivist view to an inclusivist one,
as took place in Vatican II, largely influenced by Karl Rahner. Inclusivism is the claim that there
is, in some minimized sense, salvation outside the church, but that the salvific value of other
religions is still less than that of Christianity. More significantly, whatever salvific value can be
found in non-Christian religions exists as a direct result of the salvific efficacy of Christ. That is
to say, there is a lesser sort of salvation to be found in, say, Buddhism, but it is still mediated by
Christ. So, what appears to be affirmation of other religions is at root still an elevation of
Christianity as uniquely and absolutely true. More perniciously, the intended polite “affirmation
of otherness is gained by somehow rendering the other compatible with Christianity, which of
course eliminates the very otherness it sought to affirm” (Suchocki, 2003, p. 19). And, for the
same reason that exclusivism is not a justifiable position given the nature of the epistemic
standstill, inclusivism is not tenable because it is the same claim of unique superiority disguised
as affirmation. It is useful to explicitly point out that under this view Christians continue to
claim a unique source of knowledge, or in minimum a unique level of understanding. Other
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religions may be on the right path, but Christianity is the furthest along and the only one that
correctly understands that path.
The second type of ‘complacency’ is more straightforward but much more damaging.
This is the affirmation of radical relativism, or the claim that all religions are utterly equal. If all
religions are reduced to some common essence and all claims made by each are equally true,
then any variations between religions, and indeed any aspect of any religion, is nothing but an
accident (Driver, 1987, p. 210). Not only is this a formalized acceptance of the standstill and the
corresponding inability to do better or worse, it also deeply undermines the significance of any
one tradition. Under such a view, it simply does not matter what one believes or does as long as
it is based in an uncriticizable religious position. That is the danger here. Not only does this
give up on finding the best way to believe, it allows for seemingly terrible ones.
The aim of this paper is to ride a fine line between relativism on the one hand and
absolutism on the other. This paper will focus more on absolutism than on exclusivism proper,
as taking the claims of one’s religion as wholly absolute leads quickly to taking those claims as
exclusively true. For if it is absolutely and inviolably the case that A, then any version of ~A is
automatically false. So, the two terms are not synonymous, but leaning too far towards
absolutism leads to exclusivism. A large part of walking this tightrope between absolutism and
relativism involves the development of a sort of meta-universalism1. That is to say, I will be
attempting to both allow for meaningful contributions and ethically valuable praxis by differing
and incompatible religious traditions and to establish a sort of overarching standard by which
these religions may be ethically evaluated. These standards, norms, or directionalities thus must

1

I will restrict the use of universal(ism) to positive, pluralist norms and so forth and restrict the use of absolute(ism)
to the sorts of stances that lead to negative, exclusivist norms and so forth. E.g. global reduction of suffering is a
plausible universalist norm whereas global abstinence from alcohol is an exclusivist norm derived from the belief set
of Islam taken as absolute.
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be minimal enough so as to allow for varying methods and their underlying belief structures, but
also robust enough so as to allow for meaningful guidance. In light of these practical standards,
each religion can then reexamine their own doctrines so as to best accomplish their ethical goals.
These goals are variously construed as justice, eco-human well-being, communal expectation,
and ethical transformation by those covered in the second chapter of this paper. The third
chapter will then examine a notion of religious truth that avoids the pitfalls of relativism and of
the reduction of the specific belief content of a religious tradition to an arbitrary means to an
ethical end. For although the way out of the epistemic standstill does seem to be a prioritization
of praxis, completely discarding the importance of the specific content of various belief systems
results in a different sort of relativism that is no less unpalatable than radical relativism under
which the content is solely an arbitrary means to an ethical end. The fourth chapter will then
examine Christian doctrine in particular as an example of how a religious belief set might adapt
to accommodate those practical aims and notions of religious truth. In this case, I will examine
the development of a pluralist Christology. If the epistemic rationality of religious beliefs cannot
be judged, then we shall judge them by their fruits (Matt. 7:20 New American Bible). But more
than that, we shall cultivate and nurture those fruits.
If we cannot evaluate the epistemic rationality of religions participation under MR, our
only avenue for maximizing the rationality of religious practice in light of pluralism is in terms
of practical rationality. My basic claim will be that continued religious participation is
practically rational to the degree to which it coheres with a non-relativistic understanding of the
pluralist context. That ‘non-relativistic understanding’ will be based in the normative discussion
in the following chapter as well as the model of religious truth claims in chapter III. Increasing
practical rationality will involve some basic tweaking of applications, altogether discarding

9
certain practices, and affirming others, but will also involve significant changes in the
understanding of things like Christ’s role in relation to salvation. But this will not happen
without reference to the existent belief systems, and there will still be an emphasis on internal
rationality as well. The belief systems will be called to change in significant ways, but it is
crucial that we do not throw the baby out with the bath water. As such, a large part of the
function of chapter III is a broadly conservatist one, in that it tries to maintain the internal
coherency of the religion secondarily to the primary ethical aims.
Despite this paper’s focus on interfaith relations, I confess that I am not enough a scholar
of comparative religion to try to look too closely at what the logistics of interreligious dialogue
and thus more literal cooperation might look like. That being said, the epistemic standards of
interreligious dialogue carried out in good faith will be useful in determining how various
religions ought to best understand the claims of different religious beliefs sets. I do intend to
also look at intrareligious dialogue in light of pluralist ethical standards and objectives that
would be reasonable for any religion to adopt. As such, the following chapter has characteristics
reminiscent of social contract theory in the establishment of the proposed norms.
Another way of describing this project as a whole is as the construction of a framework
by which a plurality of religions can interact fruitfully in the pursuit of the universal goal of
reducing suffering and increasing well-being. The framework provides a way by which the truth
claims of another religion can be understood and potentially learned from without taking them as
at best largely contradictory to one’s own. If the goal is to achieve those shared ethical aims,
albeit in varying and relativized modes, then there is a way in which those goals can be achieved
with maximal effectiveness. This is the sense of practical rationality I mean, and this
maximization can be achieved through the construction of a relativizable system of richer and

10
richer ethical norms constructed atop the foundation of the universal aim of well-being, and of a
system by which to understand the various ways in which that goal is approached and achieved.
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II. Pluralism and Universalist Ethical Norms
This chapter will be divided into four primary sections. The first three will be presenting
the views of Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, Paul F. Knitter, and Tom F. Driver, with some assistance
from John Hick throughout. This chapter will be examining the establishment of cross-religious
norms for ethical religious praxis and, by extension under the liberation theology inversion,
doctrine. The ordering of the three is informed by this focus. Suchocki’s 1987 essay “In Search
of Justice: Religious Pluralism from a Feminist Perspective” most explicitly deals with secondorder norms, of the three. That is to say, she is most directly concerned with how best to
construct norms for the evaluation of different religious traditions that neither exclude nor
diminish certain forms of religious expression nor fail to provide any actual normative force. I
will briefly appeal to John Hick’s paper “On the Grading of Religions” as well, as it operates in
much the same area. The second author is Paul F. Knitter, who both explicitly offers potential
norms as well as operating in the second order. The third will be Tom F. Driver. He most
certainly has second-order norms relevant to this discussion, but norms which have to be
extracted somewhat. His primary purpose is the development of a trinitarian ethic based in a
Christology appropriate for pluralism and religious dynamism generally. He will appear more in
the fourth chapter. The fourth section of this chapter will step back, evaluate the three authors
presented and the insights gleaned from them and explicitly establish how the nature of their
justification is analogous to a social contract theory.

II.i Suchocki and Justice
Before getting into Suchocki, Hick’s provocatively titled “On the Grading of Religions”
is useful in framing the nature of this entire normative discussion. Hick (1981) does claim that
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“religious phenomena…can in principle be classified or graded” and that “the basic criterion is
the extent to which they promote or hinder the great religious aim of salvation/liberation,” but
denies that religions taken as totalities can be ranked in this way (p. 406-407). This is similar to
the issue had by the utilitarian calculus when applied at a fine-grained level; it is relatively easy
to tell if something has good or bad consequences, or broadly does more good or more harm, but
it is impossible to quantify such that option A is, say, 7% better than option B. In the case of
religious phenomena, the best that can really be determined is a sort of positive or negative (or
neutral) directionality. The key to this whole project is a satisfactory definition of
salvation/liberation. Salvation and liberation are used more or less interchangeably in the
liberation theology literature broadly, though in my work I will stick to ‘salvation’ and ‘salvific,’
while I will refer to the movement as a whole as ‘liberation theology’. Due to the practical
nature of the discussion, salvation ought to be understood as this-worldly salvation, hence the
synonymity with liberation. Salvation of the metaphysical kind such as personal immortality
falls into the disagreements that this paper has set aside due to the impossibility of MR
adjudication.
Suchocki (1987) begins her paper with what she believes is the central aim of liberation
theology generally: “the normative justice that creates well-being in the world community” (p.
149). She is extremely conscious of the dangers of imposing a new sort of meta-absolute norm
that would play much the same role as exclusivism or inclusivism in the hinderance of an
authentic pluralism. She rejects the idea that one can truly step outside of their own traditions or
“religious and cultural histories” and take a post-modernist ‘view from nowhere’ and is careful to
avoid attempting to do so (Suchocki, 2003, p. 15). The impartial observer in the introduction to
this paper occupied a hypothetical ‘view from nowhere’ in his lack of affiliation or knowledge of
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any religion, but that example was ultimately constructed so as to show the inapplicability of the
MR standards of mind-independent, verifiable truth in the religious realm. In practice, no one in
religious dialogue is able to fully extricate themselves from the context. It is unlikely that one
could even do so culturally, let alone from the impact religion has upon culture even if one is not
themselves a practitioner. Such a standard is relegated to questions of science and empirical
verification, which does not serve us in this context. This rejection of a god’s eye view is in line
with Langdon Gilkey’s (1987) claim that there is a “requirement of a center for praxis” and that
one “must stand somewhere and act from some basis” (p. 46). The same line of thought will also
be echoed by Victoria Harrison in the third chapter. This is one of the reasons that liberation
theology generally is dialogical in form, because of the inescapability of one’s own standpoint2.
Thereby, the problem of who defines well-being is particularly sticky, due to the variance of
cultural values and the non-option of ‘the view from nowhere.’ This is also why Suchocki
(1987), echoing Knitter, calls for “a shift of judgment from ideological ground to ethical ground
(p. 150). A fundamental sense of well-being should be better able to escape cultural differences
than the ideological baggage behind it in various particularized forms. However, the richer the
sense of well-being becomes, the more relativized it necessarily will have to be.
Following her basic statement of the goals of liberation theology, the relationship
between ‘justice’ and ‘well-being’ needs to be clearly defined, as it is the driving concept for her
position. Suchocki (1987) offers that justice ought to be thought of “as a concrete reality
manifested in concrete communities” and that “laws are to be abstracted from situations that

2

In my case, given that I am neither deeply versed in comparative religion nor literally engaged in dialogue, I will
have to emulate social contract theory. That is to say, I will have to be satisfied with the process adhering to the
standard that if all hypothetical parties could agree to a given proposed norm in the absence of coercion, power
differentials, and so forth it could be reasonably said that the norm is good for all involved. Although this seems
like a god’s eye view, as will be rejected, it is simply the movement from a universal concrete reality to more
nuanced and relativized sense of justice abstracted from that concrete reality. I believe it avoids this issue.
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exhibit well-being” (p. 154). Moreover, well-being also feeds back into justice in the sense that
well-being serves as the norm by which laws are judged as just or unjust. So, a just law is based
in the promotion of well-being and an unjust law is identified as such when it hinders or reduces
well-being. Identifying justice as a concrete reality in this way helps its plausibility as a universal
norm and hinders the potential for a culturally imperialist or absolutist abstract ideal, which is a
clever move. So, since justice is dependent upon well-being, Suchocki (1987) gives a tri-level
conceptualization of well-being in which the levels are “successive, building upon the other, and
each moving toward a multiplicity of forms,” resulting in richer and more relativized conceptions
of justice within various contexts (p. 155). The higher and more complex the level, the more
relativity between groups as to what constitutes well-being.
The first level is fundamental physical well-being such as food and shelter and the base
existence of a community and its members, unnormed in its structure. The second level has to
do with a more nebulous sense of human dignity and recognition within a community. The third
level is “openness to self-development and self-determination within the context of community,”
with the community now fully self-normed in its structure (Suchocki, 1987, p. 154). It is
important to point out that the goals of dignity, recognition, self-development and selfdetermination can mean very different things depending on variables such as the level of
individualism valued by each community, but that this is accommodated by relativizing the
details of those broad goals to the communities. Fundamental physical well-being thought of as
minimally the reduction of suffering and unwilling privation in the domains of food, shelter, and
the like is relatively straightforward. Human dignity and recognition within a community would
mean at least basic human rights and certain social rights. Some social rights would likely be
restricted in societies with royalty or even aristocracy, but as long as one is not prohibited from
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‘baseline’ social rights and services, the second level ought to obtain. The third level is the most
nebulous, but I offer that it would be along the lines of maximal ethical self-determination within
a given cultural and religious context. The more complex and underdetermined the level, the
more room for relativization between contexts.
These three levels clearly show the treacherous position between absolutism and
relativism. The fundamental idea is that people ought not to suffer, but the more positive and
social senses of well-being in the second and third levels require room for and affirmation of
differences between religious communities. It is much easier to try to generate negative norms
which prohibit base suffering3 than it is to construct positive ones that account for rich, social
well-being. A benefit of Suchocki (1987) attempting to work in this positive dimension is that
her sense of “justice implicitly and explicitly pushes toward an affirmation of pluralism” as well
as acting as “a criterion for judging the forms of pluralism it engenders” (p. 155). Not only is the
relativizability built into Suchocki’s program, it is also constructed such that it resists unethical
relativization through the interrelation of justice and well-being. A key point with regards to this
entire project is the divergence of this ethical criterion from both doctrinal and historical criteria.
It is essential to recognize that a religious phenomenon could be historically and doctrinally
authentically Christian without meeting the ethical criteria. In her words, “failure of the criterion
becomes to that extent a judgment against the [ethical]4 value of the form, although it would not
necessarily speak to the Christianness of the form” (Suchocki, 1987, p. 155). And this
divergence is really the key shift that must be made in order to develop a truly salvific, nonradically relative pluralism: the prioritization of ethical fruits over purely orthodox adherence to

3

cf. Knitter in section II.ii
My specification, as I will make the distinction between the ethical and religious dimensions more explicitly in
chapter III. This is not to say that the ethical criterion will not have priority, but it is important to note that it is not
all that is at play, as that would engender a sort of relativism about specific beliefs.
4
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Christianity as it has been. Driver in particular will focus on this, and both his and Knitter’s
perspectives will make up much of the fourth chapter.
This is not to say that the historical and cultural undergirding ought to be discarded; they
are what underly the concrete forms of well-being within her method. The first and fundamental
level more or less escapes cultural variation, but the second and third levels most certainly do
not. There will be obvious differences between what different religions and cultures consider to
be the more nuanced senses of well-being, and much of that will come from their ideological
background. But some must be discarded, as in cases in which a religion ends up
“justify[ing]…poverty as a necessary condition for the attainment of a good not presently seen or
experienced” (Suchocki, 1987, p. 157-158). At least some strains of Christianity have in the past
done this. However, more generally speaking, a common aspect of religion, specifically in the
realm of this-worldy salvation, is an idea of how the world ought to be. With this comes the
implication that it is not yet that way; this almost always involves at least the base sense of
suffering. This can be taken advantage of within the process of norm construction in that a not
overly, but adequately, relativized sense of justice could be found in each religion if justice is
characterized “as that which renders life meaningful in light of a vision of what existence should
be” (Suchocki, 1987, p. 159). Moreover, justice couched as such can be used intrareligiously to
examine whether or not its existent societal form corresponds with its idealized vision of justice.
There can also be intradoctrinal examination of which ultimate and penultimate values are being
pursued and upheld in light of this idealized vision. And this is not wholly foreign to the, for
example, American Christianity; take the shift in which parts of the Bible were reflected in
doctrine before and after the abolition of slavery in the United States. The values that were
presented in doctrine that justified the disproportionate suffering of a segment of society began to
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no longer match society’s understanding of justice and were slowly discarded. This sort of
dynamism with respect to ideals of justice over time will be central to Driver’s account. Such a
partially internal basing also works to help mitigate the charge of pluralism as being merely an
absolutism of the second order. That is to say, it is not the pluralists forcing the change from on
high, but the Christian community reaching that conclusion on the basis of their own beliefs and
values no longer being reflected in those aspects of doctrine. And it is indeed in this order, and
historically has been. It is in practice a less foreign idea to shift doctrine on the basis of
communal values than it seems, despite the common view that values are derived from and
dependent upon doctrine.

II.ii Knitter and Eco-Human Well-Being
Knitter (1995), similarly to Suchocki, makes the claim that “justice or eco-human wellbeing can serve as a universal criterion for truth without becoming a new foundational or
absolute norm for truth” (p. 118). There are two central differences in approach that should be
pointed out first that I find to be essential contributions to the picture laid out by Suchocki. The
first is evident in the above quotation: the expansion of well-being to include both human and
ecological aspects. Knitter makes this expansion in his 1995 One Earth, Many Religions:
Multifaith Dialogue & Global Responsibility; it does not contradict his earlier work but merely
expands its focus. One of the main benefits of this expansion is that it broadens the common
ground between religions. Not only is there a sort of “shared locus of religious experience” as
well as some sort of minimal “moral commons” with respect to well-being, but also a shared
context for those divine experiences, mundane experiences, and moral concerns and
responsibilities (Knitter, 1995, p. 103, 125; Knitter, 1987, p. 186). This also reinforces a
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“common cosmological lineage” in the sense that we all share as our roots the Earth (Knitter,
1995, p. 120). And this is all an added bonus to the more basic fact that ecological degradation is
clearly correlated with human suffering, or at the very least inversely correlated with the degree
of positive well-being. This more concrete point of common intersection also avoids some of the
problems that come with merely boiling down all religious experience to the same thing to serve
as a common ground, as this often mischaracterizes and reduces the value of and the variation
between those traditions. Instead, Knitter (1987) proposes that “perhaps there is a common
approach or a common context with which we can begin dialogue” that is not reducing religion
down to some purported shared essence. Rather, he suggests “the preferential option for the poor
and the nonperson – that is, the option to work with and for the victims of this world” (Knitter,
1987, p. 185). This benefits further from his later expansion to include ecological suffering, but
starting from this point helps to ensure that new norms are not set up that increase the well-being
of some but not of those whose voices are not heard. This approach is why I find that Knitter in
particular echoes the justificatory mode of social contract theory.
The second central divergence is Knitter’s explicit statement that his soteriological
project involves both a positive and a negative assertion. The positive assertion is the active
promotion of eco-human well-being, and the negative assertion is “a resolute ‘no’ to the
sufferings, human and ecological, that torment our world” (Knitter, 1995, p. 99). I find this
second divergence to be of particular use in the pluralist dance between absolutism and
relativism. To take Suchocki’s layered structure of well-being, it becomes increasingly hard to
specify what constitutes well-being the more nuanced the levels get. This is the room that is left
for relativism between communities, and it is essential. But, the denial of suffering is a clearer
common ground throughout. We agree far more on what constitutes suffering that we do on
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what constitutes its inverse. There are of course still disagreements, but the absence of suffering
seems to me a firmer common ground. This is not to say that Suchocki does not account for this,
only that Knitter’s explicit bifurcation is quite useful. In minimum, as we work through the
sticky process of establishing positive and progressively relativized norms, we can work to
reduce suffering in the meantime.
One more commentary on the Knitter quotation that opened this section. He uses the
phrase ‘a criterion for truth5,’ which prima facie seems absolutist or at least confusing. Knitter
(1995) is expanding on a claim made by Langdon Gilkey about the paradoxical, dialectical
nature of truth in the context of pluralism.
When I make a claim that something is true not primarily because it makes logical
or coherent sense, and not mainly because it corresponds to my tradition, but
because it is necessary for promoting human justice and ecological stability, then
I am experiencing two things: a) I feel that insofar as this truth is essential for the
well-being or salvation of the planet or other beings, I must stand up for it, defend
it, maybe be ready to die for it; my truth is absolute for me. b) But I also feel that
I can and must be open to any other version or edition of truth that will enable us
to attain these same goals of well-being, or to understand them even more
adequately; I realize and am challenged by the relativity of the truth I am
proposing and living (p. 130).
So, in other words, the absoluteness is felt in the doing, in the praxis and one’s total dedication to
it, and the relativity is felt in reflection in the form of an openness to the possibility of better
ways of carrying out those actions and aims. Gilkey (1987) himself says that a center at which
one stands and basis from which one acts is necessary for praxis and that this, paradoxically,
requires acting from an absolute standpoint not admitting of relativity (p. 45-47). However, the
relativity of the pluralist liberative context is felt in reflection, in the understanding of the
relativity within that context and its myriad positions (Knitter, 1995, p. 130). Gilkey (1987)
describes this as “relative absoluteness,” in which one stays centered in the Christian mode in

5

My emphasis.
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first-order participatory praxis but relativizes that mode in second-order reflection (p. 47).
Knitter does not apply the concept quite as broadly as Gilkey does, but it is useful as an
expression of the absolute/relative tightrope liberation theology walks. Part of the pull of ethical
obligation involves the felt need to assert and assume absolute positions, but in the pluralist
context we are also drawn to recognize that these positions are relative, correctable, limited, and
so forth. The importance of Gilkey’s point has to do with the motivational structure of religious
beliefs. When one is acting on the basis of a religious belief, in acting they take that belief as
absolute, despite the fact that the belief is relativized in reflection when couched within the
pluralist context. This point will be developed further with Knitter’s claims about discipleship
and dedication in section IV.i. The idea there will be that not only is a religious belief taken as
non-relative in the moment so as to motivate action, in reflection such absoluteness can be recast
as something that is worth one’s complete allegiance, even if it is ultimately understood as being
only one possible route. Moreover, even if one cannot step fully outside of their beliefs in
reflection, simply relativizing or recasting those beliefs as such can serve as the avenue by which
one’s own doctrines are reexamined.
A way in which this concept can be applied directly to the generation of practical norms
is the idea that various religions can have very divergent experiences of truth or divinity but can
agree that these experiences must ultimately help to promote eco-human well-being or at least
help to reduce suffering. This variation in praxis, experience, and more nuanced value sets can
persist with eco-human well-being and suffering acting as shared reference points by which the
claims of other religions can be criticized or affirmed. Human and ecological suffering are both
universal and immediate and can thus be the basis of a common context underlying the relativity
(Knitter, 1995, p. 127).
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Knitter (1995) also appeals to Catholic theologian Edward Schillebeeckx in a manner
which echoes Suchocki’s claims about idealized visions. Schillebeeckx makes the claim that
global responsibility in this sense of eco-human well-being can be a sort of “communion with the
divine.” He takes the exclusivist mantra extra ecclesiam nulla salus6 and alters it to extra
mundum nulla salus7. The experience of a world of suffering and injustice leads to a “negative
experience of contrast” in which there is a “spontaneous and forceful” rejection of the way that
things are and then a “resolute yes” to how the situation might be transformed into how it ought
to be. Put another way, salvation in this sense involves a “fundamental no disclosing an
unfulfilled yes” (p. 113-114). The ‘unfulfilled yes’ will be in line with Driver’s position of
christic expectation in the following section.
What comes out of all this is a prioritization of ethical criteria with respect to the personal
and social consequences of our beliefs over mystical, rational, historical, doctrinal, and so forth
criteria (Knitter, 1995, p. 125-126). No matter how orthodox a belief, practice, doctrine, etc. is,
if it bears “unethical fruits” it ought to be regarded with suspicion at the very least (Knitter,
1987, p. 182). Moreover, in Knitter’s (1987) view, orthopraxis takes explicit priority over
orthodoxy, such that “if orthodox clarity is not required” for the promotion of liberation
theology’s salvific aims, “it can wait.” For Knitter, “praxis is both the origin and the
confirmation of theory or doctrine” (p. 191-192). That is to say, a religion’s practical aims,
thought of as a vision of how the world ought to be based upon that community’s aims and
values, is what drives the generation of a version of doctrine that accomplishes those ends. The
practical aims determine the structure of doctrine, which is confirmed by making progress

6
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‘no salvation outside the church’
‘no salvation outside the world’
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towards those aims. Such an inversion is absolutely crucial to avoid the standstill of
unresolvable doctrinal conflict that pluralism can so easily engender.

II.iii Driver: Christic Expectation and Communitas
In Driver’s 1981 book Christ in a Changing World: Toward an Ethical Christology, one
of his central arguments is a trinitarian ethic that comes out of a desire to detach the meaning and
significance of Christ from a static, fixed event in the past and reconceptualize the trinity with
respect to this dislocation. Knitter also spends much time examining how to reconceptualize
Christ and his salvific role in a pluralist Christology, but that aspect of his project runs more
parallel to the normative dimension than does Driver’s more direct treatment. As such his
contribution to that area will appear in the fourth chapter along with a more in depth look at
Driver’s, but Driver’s position needs to be addressed at least in passing in order to extricate his
normative claims. Some of the finer elements of Driver’s (1981) nuanced conception of the
trinity are not necessary for the purposes of the immediate discussion, but the central feature is a
dynamic sense of the expectation of emergent good (p. 136). Importantly, what he means by this
is an “expectancy [that] is a function of present action” (Driver, 1981, p. 148). That is to say,
there is a vital difference between what it is like to hope for something versus expecting it to
occur. Driver is not content to merely hope or to make do, and hence builds a program around
christic expectation. Christic in this context should be understood as salvific, if generalized away
from Christianity in particular.
Briefly, the structure of his trinitarian conceptualization is “two divine figures related in a
contextual field that is itself divine,” which involves “two figures of a definite character and a
third component that is ineffable” (Driver, 1981, p. 105). The idea is to emphasize that there is
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no priority between ‘members’ of the trinity, that no ‘member’ is unchanging, and that Spirit is
the context in which the two figures of Father and Son interact. He then broadens this relation as
a model for relations generally, in the sense that any relation exists in a field of divine potential.
And for Driver (1981), where these expectations are based is in the “experience of community in
awareness of the field of divine potential” (p. 148). The idea is that a “Christian community [is
a] community of christic expectation” (Driver, 1981, p. 134). Specifically, Driver (1981) appeals
to Victor Turner’s notion of communitas, which Turner defined as “communal life freed from
duty and devoted to existence in mutual love” (p. 119). Importantly, the expectations shared by
such a community come out of their shared communal values. Their expectancy is about
actualizing those values out of the divine potential of the Spirit. Driver (1981) himself restated
the concept in religious terms as the idea “that people desire not only to live in community but to
experience therein a sacred communion of life with life” (p. 161). Notice that this concept of
community above and beyond simply living within a group mirrors Suchocki’s higher levels of
well-being. Part of what his focus on fundamental relationality achieves is gleaning the insight
that “ethical decisions and values do not focus on whether people should be related but on the
mode and quality of their interactions (Driver, 1981, p. 146). The assumption of relations is
prior to any ethical discussion and is thus fundamental.
These dynamic communal expectations and divine communion manifest, according to
Driver (1981), as focusing on “the just integration of society” (p. 138). The thought is similar to
Knitter and Suchocki’s ideas of a vision of how life ought to be. And for Driver, the idea is that
the burden of righting the wrongs found in the contrast of how life currently is versus how it
ought to be falls upon the community rather than the individual, and that it is the duty of the
community to deal with opposing interests or values by rectifying disagreements through
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dialogue and growth. It is, however, interesting that Driver (1981) uses the phrase ‘just
integration’ as the focus earlier, because he makes the claim that it is really the pain felt from the
“violations” of the “experience of communitas in worship” rather than “an abstract ideal of
justice…[that] motivates a Christian social ethic” (p. 169). It seems to me that communitas
generates christic expectations which are then contrasted with their failure to obtain. One
example that he mentions is the conflict between such a christic expectation and “social
structures which guarantee privilege at the expense of communal justice” (Driver, 1981, p. 148).
A modern example of such a situation might be the Dalits, or Untouchables, a Hindu social
group that is heavily ostracized on the basis of the Hindu caste system. Driver’s proposal that it
is the pain of contrast rather than an abstract sense of justice that truly motivates ethical action is
similar to Suchocki’s basing of justice as well-being thought of as a concrete reality. The pain is
similarly concrete, and similarly advantageous.

II.iv Justice, community, and the preferential option
So, the task is now to synthesize these various approaches to set up an appropriate metanormative system for the establishment of justified and relativized norms within various
communities. The fundamental starting point, in my view, ought to be the negative prong of
Knitter’s bifurcation. Before well-being can be effectively maximized, suffering must be
reduced. This can be accounted for in Suchocki’s position because the establishment of the first
level of physical well-being necessitates a reduction in suffering, but Knitter’s approach is
helpfully explicit. I have been making analogies to social contract theory, and Knitter’s
preferential option for the poor is the starting point for that. An essential element of achieving
communal justice is to look to those who experience the highest degree of injustice, or lack of
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well-being. There cannot be a truly legitimate, higher-tier sense of communal justice if a
segment of society is not participating in it. In a hypothetical agreement in which all members of
society were behind something analogous to Rawls’s veil, the basic, concrete sense of well-being
for all would be inarguable as an aim. The brilliance of Rawls’s veil is how radically undesirable
well-being or prosperity for some that comes at the expense of the well-being of others appears if
one does not or cannot assume an advantaged position in the group. And in terms of
justification, the grounding of justice in concrete well-being by Suchocki and the ethical
motivation of Driver’s communal expectation as a concrete pain at the violation of communitas
give a foundational starting point from which the higher levels of justice can be abstracted. This
puts this project in a better position than merely starting from an abstract ideal.
Moreover, getting at it in this way makes communal well-being necessarily the goal. If
one assumes their position to be the worst in society, which functions analogously to Knitter’s
preferential option for the poor, then the only option is to better all of the community. And this
is in line with Suchocki and Driver in particular. Community is central in what is ethically
valuable in this system, both in that it is an aim and that it helps determines what the ethical
expectant vision is, which is then reflected in the higher levels of justice. In basing the more
nuanced elements of well-being in the communities, my project in this chapter has thus been a
meta-normative or meta-social contract theory. That is to say, it is a generalized normative
system about how best to set up particular normative systems in particular communities. That is
not to say that they are isolated or relative systems. They meet at base human suffering and the
existence of a community generally, let alone existing within a set of global communities. If a
norm in one community gives a small benefit to well-being internal to that community but causes
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obviously more base suffering to another, then it ought to be discarded, as physical well-being is
prior to the later social senses of well-being.
Additionally, one ought to be concerned about ecological well-being, if only for the fact
that we live here8. One way to look at this is to analogize Suchocki’s notion of levels of wellbeing. There are least two ecological levels: the base existence of an ecological system at all,
with higher, richer value in ecosystemic stability. This mirrors Suchocki’s level in that higher
levels of well-being are constituted in part by relations within a community. It does seem clear
that ecological well-being ought not to have priority over human well-being, but it should not be
discarded or overly diminished. In fact, in a later book Suchocki (2003) distinguishes the dual
level “responsibility to care for the earth in its particulars and also in its wholeness,” which is
amenable to my proposition (p. 60).
The basic idea is the setting up of a normative system which is reasonable for any
individual adopt by way of a meta-system which would be reasonable for any community to
adopt. These normative systems will then be the primary basis for the religious self-examination
of the fourth chapter by way of serving as the ethical metric. The expectations of religious
communities differ, but they should be as one voice rather than highly stratified in their
influence, as that influence ought to be for the benefit of the entire community. Hopefully even
if I am not literally engaging in dialogue in this paper, the end result would be much the same if
different traditions were in dialogue with the preferential option for the poor and a sense of
justice as well-being as their basic guiding principles.

8

I am of the mind that ecological stability is of some intrinsic value, but that discussion would put this paper far into
the weeds.
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III. A Pluralist Conception of Religious Truth
I will now turn to the difficult problem of developing a suitable and principled conception
of truth within a pluralist context. The basic problem of the incompatibility of the claims of
different religions is perhaps the greatest thorn in the side of any pluralist position and merely
setting them aside, even with the addition of a separate, ethical criterion, is still a relativism
about specific beliefs that I wish to avoid. To begin with, take Joseph Runzo’s dual-level
conception of the types of beliefs involved in religions. He claims that religious belief is
constituted at both the first and second orders. The first order includes “specific beliefs…about
the nature of the ultimate reality and the way in which it gives meaning to life” (Runzo, 1988, p.
346). These beliefs make up the various religious doctrines that are ostensibly in conflict. But
much more crucially, religions also involve “the meta-belief that the religion in question does
indeed refer to a transcendent reality which gives meaning to life” (Runzo, 1988, p. 346). This
second claim is of course the basis for claims of exclusivity, given that if religious beliefs
correspond to a transcendent reality, they cannot all do so without contradiction. Despite having
only claims of unique sources of knowledge and the principle of non-contradiction, very few
practitioners withhold belief on the literal truth of their metaphysical beliefs about ultimate
reality. Furthermore, this belief in correspondent, literal truth is usually what acts as the
justifying basis for action, not merely the ethical fruits. This is again a place where the pluralist
project broadly runs up against the felt experience of the average religious practitioner, even if
pluralists generally only avoid making positive claims about correspondence. That is to say, we
take the pluralist context as negating the ability to claim exclusivity without taking it as negating
the legitimacy of religious practice wholesale. Although I cannot do anything to maintain felt
experience in this particular regard, this chapter as a whole provides a sort of conservatist
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impulse to try and counterbalance the rather radical reconceptualizations of chapters II and IV
with the maximal maintenance of the existing religious belief sets, given pluralism, of course.
Now, Runzo’s bifurcation is relevant to Hick’s claim discussed in the introduction that
distinguishes between doctrinal disputes and salvific efficacy, echoed by Knitter. This move is
motivated by the fact that it cannot be adjudicated which, if any, religion does in fact truly refer,
or more or less truly refers as compared to other religions. The idea being that if it’s impossible
to tell if any religion is ‘right,’ then we ought to more or less simply set aside the question and
focus on this-worldy salvation. But the question emerges of whether, in “leav[ing]
disagreements aside in the interest of cooperative work,” we are thereby failing to truly address
“the depth of the other,” left instead with a relativism about specific beliefs (Suchocki, 2003, p.
20). This is not the same degree of relativism as radical relativism, in that there is still an ethical
metric, but as long as that metric is met, there would be no religious standard for the content that
caused the satisfaction of the metric. As it stands, each religious community can accept that the
ethical output from another can be equally valuable but typically doesn’t view the basing
religious content as equally legitimate. Moreover, specific belief relativism would deeply favor
humanism, in that it would simply be more efficient to just get to the ethical output and avoid the
religious baggage, if that is all there is to it. Thus, we do need to at least develop some sort of
principled way to account for religious truth claims, even if the question of its correspondence to
a transcendent reality is insoluble.
Hick, for slightly more complicated reasons than simple inability to adjudicate, as will be
outlined in the following section, “invites us to apply a principle of charity” as a result of this
“veil of ignorance,” such that each “of the world’s religions are equally worthy of belief” and
that each “offers an authentic way of achieving the religious goal” of this-worldly salvation
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(Harrison, 2006, p. 288). A similar end result is accomplished by Knitter’s definition of truth
laid out in the block quote in section II.ii9. However, this definition of truth as that which is
“necessary for promoting human justice and ecological stability” is admittedly very far removed
from any recognizable or intuitive notion of truth and in many ways seems to diminish the
religious value of the truths as merely means to an end (Knitter, 1995, p. 130). I do think that a
principle of charity is warranted by the veil of ignorance. Indeed, “charity is forced on us” in the
attempt to understand other viewpoints. To try to actually understand involves “count[ing] them
right in most matters” (Davidson, 1973, p. 19). But we must be very careful to avoid veering off
into relativism regarding the beliefs underlying the praxis. As such, the aim of this section is to
develop a reasonable conception of religious truths as distinguished from Knitter’s sense of truth,
which I will call ‘salvific efficacy.’ The difficulty is in developing a form of religious truth that
avoids both the problem of incommensurability and is still a meaningful, non-relative form
despite the lack of verifiable correspondence or reference by which MR operates. This still will
likely fall short of satisfying the felt experience of Runzo’s meta-belief, but it will nonetheless
advance the conversation. It is primarily Victoria Harrison’s application of Hilary Putnam’s
internal realism to pluralism that will achieve this goal. Terrence Merrigan (1997) claims that
“the pluralists’ understanding of religious knowledge cannot be ultimately integrated into any
recognizable form of orthodox Christianity” (p. 706). That very likely will remain true. But the
goal is to at least be able retain more of the felt religious experience of what it is to be a Christian
than may prima facie appear possible within a pluralist context.
In the subsequent sections I will begin by discussing the views of John Hick before
turning to Victoria Harrison and then bringing the discussion back to bear on Knitter’s practical

9

Although, Knitter will ultimately offer that in interreligious dialogue we must only hold that it is possible that there
is value to be found in other religions rather than assuming from the start that there in fact is, cf. section III.iii.
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salvific efficacy. The reason for so doing is that Hick’s view of religious truth is famously
unpalatable to many, despite his more general structural insights about the problem of religious
diversity. Harrison is directly engaged with these issues and her view is in large part an attempt
to avoid some of the pitfalls of Hick’s. I find that she succeeds in developing a sense of religious
truth that has a depth not found in Knitter’s pragmatic focus.

III.i Hick’s Divine Noumenon
To put the earlier point a different way, Hick follows Wilfred Cantwell Smith in the idea
that religions are not fundamentally sets of beliefs, instead proposing that their central concern is
“‘the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness,’” which
is Hick’s definition of this-worldly salvation (Runzo, 1988, p. 352). This distinction between
religious belief and the ethical dimension will be crucial to this chapter as a whole.
will be focusing solely on the belief set dimension, but this is importantly not at the expense of
compatibility with a separate ethical dimension. Hick (1988) seems to overcorrect in his
decentralization of religious belief sets in that he finds conflicting truth claims to be largely
irrelevant, as well as reducing distinct methods of transformation to a single essence (p. 365).
Both of these moves are often taken to be a reduction of the dignity of the various faith
communities. If the particulars of the beliefs aren’t important, then it seems unclear how they
are also supposed to be taken as valuably as they are in the felt experience of practitioners
(Runzo, 1988, p. 354). Moreover, simply reducing the importance of differences of history,
doctrine, metaphysics, and so forth “does not provide an intellectually satisfying solution to the
persistence of those differences” (Merrigan, 1997, p. 702).
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It is important, however, to understand the background and motivations for Hick’s arrival
at that position, as he is of enormous influence in pluralist philosophy. It will also be helpful in
setting up Harrison’s internal pluralism in the following section, as she is in large part
responding to that influence. Hick “proposed what he considered ‘a Copernican revolution’
within the discipline” of religious pluralism and exclusivism (Harrison, 2006, p. 288). The
degree to which the metaphor is appropriate will become more apparent as I outline the
background of his views. His revolution was based in the application of Kantian metaphysics to
religion10. Christian exclusivism, like Ptolemaic astronomy, placed Christianity at the center of
the universe, and all other religions were of secondary importance. And in inclusivism, the
metaphor gains further traction in that the other religions were dependent upon Christianity for
any inferior salvific value they did have. Hick shifted the picture such that Christianity also
began to orbit, this time around a nebulous Real or Ultimate. No religion was truly correct in
that they are not true representations of the Real but gain value by receiving mediated contact. In
the terms of the metaphor, they are shined upon by the Real and held in their orbit by its gravity.
It is important to see how Hick got to this position. He saw religious diversity as
presenting what he considered to be an exhaustive trilemma. Either a) no religion is at all true
and is mere illusion, b) only one religion is true, or c) the underlying basis for religion is
noumenal (Harrison, 2006, p. 291). In the postulation of a noumenon, there are two fundamental
Kantian theses operating in the background. The first is the claim that all experience is
structured by the mind such that ‘raw experience’ or direct, unstructured contact with base reality
is impossible. The second is the distinction between this structured experience, phenomena, and
the underlying, unknowable noumenon that is mediately experienced (Runzo, 1988, p. 353).
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I will limit the degree to which Kant is explained to only what is necessary for the purposes of this paper, as he is
notoriously quagmirical.
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Applied to religion, religious experience is merely a phenomenal, mediated, and structured
experience of the Eternal noumenon.
Let us return to the trilemma. Hick rejects a) because he does not believe that religion is
mere illusion, that there is something true happening, even if imperfect or distorted. He rejects
b) because it cannot be the case that one’s arbitrary place of birth and cultural context determines
that they and they alone have the true religious position. Thus, he postulates a noumenon.
Although this constitutes a way to retain religious value in the face of religious diversity, it has
severe effects on the meaning of religion, which is found to be objectionable by many, for
obvious reasons. The idea is that all religions “embody different perceptions and conceptions of,
and correspondingly different responses to, the Real of the Ultimate.” The experience of the
Real is accessible to all, but the role of the “concrete religious traditions” is reduced to “the
forum within which religious experience becomes possible” (Merrigan, 1997, p. 695). Not only
that, but no religion is actually describing the Real with any accuracy with the mediating context
of their respective forum (Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 8). Thus, religions are all literally false, or the
unsatisfying “mythologically true;” they are something radically different than what their
adherents take them to be (Harrison, 2006, p. 295-7). To put it in Runzo’s terms, in Hick’s view
the MR reference meta-belief is not only false but wholly unachievable.
Beyond even the by definition unverifiable metaphysics11, it seems wrong to equate “core
religious concepts such as ‘salvation,’ ‘nirvana,’ and ‘moksha’ [as] roughly equivalent”
(Harrison, 2006, p. 297). I am quite amenable to a sort of overarching ethical directionality such
as Hick’s transformative process or the other norms discussed in the previous chapter, but am
unsatisfied with the pure reduction to that and that alone. The difficulty of doing so is

11

It is reached through reasoning backwards from religious experience.
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particularly evident in Hick’s response to the objection of morally motivated atheists who appear
to undergo the same ethical transformation he lays out as the center of religion. Harrison
summarizes his response as basically a characterization of them as ‘anonymous theists’ to
demonstrate its similarity to Rahnerian inclusivism’s ‘anonymous Christian,’ part of the very
doctrine Hick was attempting to refute! If that transformation is type-identified with religion,
there are deep problems. But if the ethical directionality is separated from the religious beliefs
such that religious beliefs are a sufficient but not necessary motivation for participating in that
ethical transformation, non-religious humanists can be made sense of.

III.ii Harrison’s Internal Pluralism
Victoria Harrison is attempting to provide an answer to the same problem that Hick saw
to be posed by religious diversity, but is looking to avoid swinging so far towards relativism.
Any de-absolutizing of the truth of religious belief will unavoidably diminish it in some sense,
but the aim is to not wholly erase it. Her move is the application of Hilary Putnam’s internal
realism to religious truth. As such, some exposition of Putnam’s position is required, to a much
larger extent than exposition of Kant was required for Hick. It is interesting, though, that I find
that Putnam’s internal realism can better handle some classic objections when restricted to the
realm of religious knowledge.
Putnam distinguishes between MR and internal realism. Recall MR’s three central
theses: “(1) that the world consists of a fixed totality of mind-independent objects; (2) that there
is exactly one true and complete description of the way the world is; and (3) that truth involves
some sort of correspondence.” Putnam’s internal realism denies all three claims. This is in large
part an attempt to break away from the dichotomy of objective and subjective conceptions of
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rationality and truth (Harrison, 2006, p. 289-290). This is part of the brilliance of Harrison’s
move, in that that mirrors the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism that pluralism
attempts to avoid.
The central claim here is that “the notion of truth does not make sense outside of a
conceptual scheme as it would be developed under conditions of ideal inquiry” (Ruhmkorff,
2013, p. 10). Donald Davidson offers several definitions of conceptual schemes. I will be
tackling his objections to the idea of conceptual schemes generally further below. The definition
best suited to Putnam’s view is “systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation”
(Davidson, 1973, p. 5). This system stands in an organizing relation to experience or reality
(Davidson, 1973, p. 13). Specific to Putnam, though, is the inclusion of conditions of ideal
inquiry and idealized rational acceptability. This distinguishes him from mere conceptual
relativism, which can also fit that particular definition of Davidson’s. For Putnam, truth and
rational acceptability are interdependent notions, but are not synonymous. Being justified in
believing a claim is not the same as it being true, which is why it is a form of realism12. Instead,
truth is a form of idealized rational acceptability that involves “some sort of ideal coherence of
our beliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves
represented in our belief system” (Putnam, 1992, p. 49). And it is the inclusion of multiple
divergent belief systems that drives the innovative aspect with respect to pluralism. Putnam
rejects the idea “that truth is somehow independent of all conceptual schemes or that it is tied to
one, and only one,” as MR claims (Harrison, 2006, p. 291). The claim is that ideal inquiry
within each conceptual scheme could lead to multiple theories that are all ideal but nonetheless
in conflict. And, if truth does not make sense outside of a conceptual scheme due to there not

This is in response to Dummett’s anti-realism, which “reduces truth to what one is warranted in asserting”
(Harrison, 2006, p. 290, fn.14).
12
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being truth from a god’s eye view, then it makes no sense to ask what is really true in the way
that MR would. This also rejects Hick’s view, as part and parcel of Putnam’s view is the
rejection of “the coherence of the idea of truths which outrun our ability to know them”
(Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 11). Even if, for Hick, no one could know the Real from a god’s eye view,
his theory still heavily relies on how things ‘really’ are outside of any conceptual scheme (or,
outside of any phenomenal conditioning, in his terms).
An example of Putnam’s concerning divergent ideal theories regarding objects and
existence will be helpful. He asks us to consider a world comprised of three colored atoms. For
a ‘Carnapian logician,’ those three objects are all that exist. But for ‘the Polish logician’ whose
conceptual scheme also considers aggregates to be objects, there are seven objects: each atom,
three different pairs, and a trio. The two incommensurate answers to the question of how many
objects exist are both objectively true within their respective conceptual schemes (Harrison,
2006, p. 292). Neither fails to be a ‘genuine truth.’ ‘Three’ is trueCL and ‘seven’ is truePL.
I will now cover Harrison’s application of internal realism to pluralism before treating
objections to Putnam and Harrison at the same time, as the plausibility of her theory in large part
depends upon the plausibility of his. Though, given Harrison’s narrowing of application to the
religious domain in specific, I find that there is not a perfect correspondence in vulnerability to
objections between the two.
As with internal realism, internal pluralism does not admit of talk of a Real that exists
outside of and independent of any particular religious conceptual scheme (henceforth RCS 13).
And given the plenitude of different RCSs, there is a possibility of different religious realities
with their respectively different religious truths. I would, in its application to religion, define an

Harrision uses ‘faith-stance,’ but I do not want to run away from Davidson’s upcoming objection to conceptual
schemes and want that to be explicit.
13
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RCS as a system of concepts that stand in an organizing relation to both religious experience and
the purported cosmological or divine aspects of reality. As with the conceptual schemes of the
logicians, variance in beliefs contained within different RCSs does not entail that either fails to
contain genuine truths. Moreover, these truths remain as such independent of correspondence
(Harrison, 2006, p. 292). This works to counter the incompatibility problem if the idea is that
conflicting beliefs cannot all be true because they cannot both conflict and all correctly refer.
That being said, some, none, or all14 RCSs could have truths in the MR sense within them, but
that is insoluble. So instead, we can speak of degrees of success between RCSs in the internal
pluralist sense. This is not to say that different RCSs are successful or not in the attainment of a
single ethical goal, ala Hick, but rather successful in terms of intra-RCS truth. There of course is
room for comparison of the ethical fruits of different RCSs, but that is a different evaluative
dimension than religious truth. Internal pluralism is not subjectivism because the truths are
dependent upon the RCS. But nor is it relativism in the sense that what is true is simply
whatever the RCS says, unexamined (Harrison, 2006, p. 293-295). Ideal inquiry could
conceivably reach a conclusion such as the Christian god not existing due to the problem of
evil’s intractability (Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 12). Beliefs that are stable and convergent within the
RCS tend towards intra-RCS truth, but the possibility of revision is demanded by ideal inquiry
(Harrison, 2006, p. 291).
Between different RCSs, there is no legitimate dispute if the claims in question do not
genuinely enter into each other’s RCSs (Harrison, 2006, p. 293). For instance, if a Muslim says
to a Hindu ‘Mohammed is the prophet,’ there is no genuine conflict because such beliefs do not
fit within the Hindu RCS. However, a Shiite and a Sunni could have a more legitimate

14

cf. Raimon Panikkar’s ontological pluralism
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disagreement. Simply put, internal pluralism accepts intra-RCS bivalence but not inter-RCS
bivalence (Harrison, 2006, p. 296). There is of course the question of where to draw the line
with respect to what constitutes a distinct RCS in cases of sects such as the Shiites and the
Sunnis, but the broader point remains.
I will now to turn to some objections to internal realism and internal pluralism. The first
will be an objection from Donald Davidson against the very idea of conceptual schemes at all15,
which is of course central to internal pluralism. He claims that there is an underlying paradox in
conceptual schemes, though it ought to be noted that the context for his objection is against a
more general form of conceptual relativism. I am not sure Putnam’s internal realism survives the
objection with its addition of ideal inquiry, but Harrision’s restriction to the religious dimension
does. Davidson (1973) says that the paradox is that on the one hand, different conceptual
systems are comprehensible given a “common coordinate system” but on the other, if there is
such a system, the different conceptual systems no longer seem to be the purported selfcontained realities (p. 6). The idea here is that if you can translate between languages, for
example, then then languages are not ‘different worlds.’ “The interdependence of belief and
meaning” is such that no meaningful interaction can occur without some comprehension of belief
(Davidson, 1973, p. 17). He suggests that the claim being made in favor of conceptual schemes
as different worlds suggests “a dualism of total scheme and uninterpreted content” (Davidson,
1973, p. 9). This does apply to Hick, but Putnam’s denial of the necessity for correspondence is
such that this is not precisely true of him. Davidson (1973), however, works under that dualism
and offers that attempting to evaluate conceptual schemes in terms of organizing an entity such
as the world comes down to the claim “that something is an acceptable [conceptual scheme]…if

15

My thanks to David Cajias Calvet for pointing out this objection.
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it is true…or largely true” (p. 16). Again, the lack of correspondence avoids this, though perhaps
unsatisfyingly in the empirical realm. Mere internal coherence and internal idealized rational
acceptability are not particularly satisfying either, as that just seems like coherentist conceptual
relativity.
And that is Davidson’s other main complaint. Even if one were to accept the idea that
one could have isolated truth-realities, one could not compare them. A “fixed-stock of
meanings” would not suffice because that would indicate ‘common coordinates’ that would
undermine the claim of separateness. Nor could a “theory-neutral reality,” as there is no such
god’s eye view under a conceptual scheme view, as Putnam would agree (Davidson, 1973, 17).
But here is where Harrison’s restriction to the religious domain works so well. Davidson is
highly focused on communication and translatability, and as such focuses on languages in
entirety. But with religious concepts, we can use secular, translatable language to express
metaphysical concepts that are not comprehensible to the other, or at least not fully. Take for
example the idea of the Trinity. One can say to a non-Christian ‘three in one’ without them
being able to comprehend its true meaning, perhaps just noting a contradiction. Even Christians
cannot truly grasp the concept, and it is in the terms of their own RCS! So, it seems that
different RCSs can interact without total translation. We can hear the words used to describe
metaphysical concepts without understanding them fully.
Moreover, when combined with the ethical norms of the previous chapter, there is not a
‘theory-neutral reality’ per se, but there is a metric by which RCSs can be evaluated that is not
purely internal nor an infinite regress of meta-RCSs. This lead us nicely into the next objection
against internal pluralism. This objection is proposed by William Alston. He makes the claim
that internal realism is internally incoherent due to the fact that “its account of conceptual
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schemes generates a vicious, infinite regress” (Alston, 2002, p. 321). Since objects are
conceptual scheme-dependent (cf. the logicians example), then conceptual schemes are metaconceptual scheme dependent, since they are no less objects. Harrison’s response is that it is true
that one cannot conceive of an object that exists outside of a conceptual scheme, and that one
would in fact need a meta-conceptual scheme to conceive of the conceptual scheme as a whole,
one can nevertheless identify objects in the world without viewing the conceptual scheme by
which one does so as itself an object. She draws an analogy to language. In order to examine a
language as a totality, one needs a meta-language of grammar and morphology and such, but one
does not need that to merely employ the language itself (Harrison, 2006, p. 298-299).
She offers a variation which is the question of switching between conceptual schemes
with respect to infinite regress generation. But people seem to be able to convert between
religions without a broader meta-conceptual scheme such as internal pluralism. It seems to me
that conversion is rarely motivated by notions such as pluralism. If one wants to understand how
different RCSs “fit together into a wider theoretical picture,” then a meta-RCS is needed. The
idea is that a meta-RCS helps to explain how RCSs work, but is not required for the RCS to
work, or even to switch between them. The same applies for switching meta-RCSs such as
internal pluralism and a Hickean view. Internal pluralism as a meta-RCS is not required for a
RCS to work, but does provide the benefit of taking different RCSs equally seriously and as
equally valuable (Harrison, 2006, p. 299-300).
This is relevant to an objection raised by Ruhmkorff. He questions if internal pluralism
as a meta-RCS “can characterize atheism, pluralism, and exclusivism as opposed views without
appeal to the god’s eye view” it denies (Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 12). However, he frames it as the
question of who is really correct because of a different purported infinite regress. If the atheism
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meta-RCS is trueA, pluralism is trueP, and exclusivism is trueE, then there is the meta-meta-RCS
that the pluralist meta-RCS is the true meta-RCS, etc. And this is in some sense true, if it is only
internalism. But my inclusion of the separate, ethical metric allows the debate to focus on
tangible results. As stated before, a simple humanism seems to do pretty well in that regard, but
so does pluralism. Exclusivism to me seems to have a disadvantage. But even then, it’s not a
settleable question if the atheist meta-RCS is true in the MR sense as compared to the pluralist
meta-RCS. The truth is internal and the ethical evaluation is impossible at a fine-grained level.
And, the ethical metric does nothing to solve the MR sense of truth. I’m okay with this. The
debate about truth can be relegated to internal ideal inquiry as long as it also follows a positive
ethical directionality that is prior to it.
This is still likely unsatisfying in some regard and is still rather removed from the
traditional felt experience of religious practitioners, but it has a large advantage over mere
conceptual relativism or reduction to only ethical output. And that was the aim of these two
chapters: to get the debate moving again and set up ways in which different RCSs can selfevaluate, at the cost of compromising the traditional standpoint. But compromises are trades.
We give up the reference meta-belief and focus on religion’s effect in the world, but not at the
wholesale expense of the traditions and beliefs that underly those effects. The ethical dimension
must be what informs the intra-RCS examination and revision of the following chapter, but the
adoption of internal pluralism as the way to characterize those RCSs preserves much more of the
dignity of the RCS than the traditional pluralist options. And this bifurcation of belief and
practice is quite amenable to internal pluralism. Harrison (2006) says that internal pluralism “is
not committed to regarding RCSs and religions as synonymous” (p. 293, fn.26). Part of a
religion is the praxis, not just the belief set. It also helps to makes sense of my response to
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Davidson’s objection on behalf of internal pluralism. Not only is it possible to achieve a
“sympathetic understanding” of another RCS without full translation (Harrison, 2006, p. 293,
fn.28), that understanding and taking of a religion to be true internally is distinct from adherence
to it (Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 21). Even if different RCSs adopt similar general ethical aims, the
particular praxes will be quite different.

III.iii Knitter and More General Objections
Knitter, with his emphasis on practical salvific efficacy, exhibits something that is
difficult to accommodate within this internal pluralist picture: the phenomenon of multiple
belonging. This is the practice of claimed “membership in multiple faiths by a single individual”
(Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 19). He pronounces the Bodhisattva vows but is primarily of a Catholic
background. There are two primary responses to this, neither of which I am particularly satisfied
with. The first is the idea that “each individually negotiated self-consistent set of practices and
doctrine can be considered a religion unto itself,” its own RCS (Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 19). The
line of what constitutes a disctinct RCS may in fact emerge at the level of sects or smaller, but I
resist the idea that that each person has their own RCS. Part of my hesitancy has to do with the
fact that the values of an RCS are intrinsically communal in nature and in origin, and such
hyperindividualization runs counter to this central feature of this account. The other potential
response is that multiple belonging is compatible on the practical level but incoherent as an RCS.
As stated above, an RCS is not necessarily synonymous with a religion as a whole, but it does
seem that for Knitter to truly be a practicing (partial?) Buddhist, Buddhism would have to enter
into his RCS. And maybe it could do so and be ideally rationally acceptable. But this does
prove a challenge for my approach, as a large part of the appeal of internal pluralism for me is
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the maximal maintenance of the integrity of RCSs thought of as historical mythos and associated
beliefs and concepts as can be achieved under an ethical examination. Part of this motivation
comes from a general worry about radically revisionary projects unchecked by any sort of
conservatist impulse. The idea here is that this conservatism will still be secondary, but will be a
reactionary counterbalance. Explicitly, internal realism in my project serves as an attempt try to
maintain the foundations of a religion so as to resist the erosion of felt experience by the
elevation of praxis and the universalist ethical norms in chapter II.
Perhaps this will be clearer if contextualized within a more explicit discussion of
Knitter’s conception of religious truth. He does not spend much time at all giving an explicit
characterization himself, but it can be extracted from his characterization of the way in which
dialoguers from different religions ought to interact. He does make the claim that “religious
language is inherently symbolic or metaphoric,” but not in such a way that “den[ies] that such
statements are making real truth claims” (Knitter, 1995, p. 149). I take these two claims as a way
of addressing the inability to apply MR to religious disputes. He maintains they are truth claims
but calls them symbolic and metaphoric to indicate how they cannot be verified in the same way
as a typical empirical description of reality. Within the domain of interpreting the claims of
another faith, he distinguishes between two ways of judging a religious truth claim: as an “act of
faith” or by interpreting the “content of faith” itself (Knitter, 1997b, p. 152). That is, he
distinguishes between absolutist claims interpreted as demonstrations of total commitment or
interpreted as descriptive claims about reality in the MR sense. This is in line with the earlier
discussion of Gilkey’s ‘relativized absoluteness.’ Praxis is felt as flowing from an absolutist
basis when taken as the justification or grounds for that action, but in second-order reflection the
contentful truth claim is taken as relative.
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And I think that the inclusion of internal pluralism along with the metric of salvific
efficacy brings to the forefront a consistent, implicit thread in Knitter. Take for instance his
hesitance to fully agree with Hick’s call to “recognize not just the possibility but the actuality of
genuine truth in our partners’ religions” (Knitter, 1997b, p. 154, fn.12). Knitter agrees in the
sense that there are ethical fruits in each, which should be understood as within the domain of
practical salvific efficacy. But he hesitates in the methodological realm, pointing both to
relativism as a concern and to the stance felt when engaging in dialogue, which is that in order to
achieve genuine engagement, one has only to affirm the possibility of something valuable in the
other’s position. Moreover, Knitter (1997b) thinks that for ideal dialogue, all that is required is
that “all religions are viewed from the beginning of the conversation, not as necessarily being
equal or the same in their truth claims but as having equal rights” (p. 154). And although this is
not explicitly a result of worries about the relativism of truth claims, nor does he seem to
ultimately carry out much less salvific reduction of religious beliefs than Hick, his hesitancy
points out a phenomena that internal pluralism can help to make sense of in such a way that
avoids relativism of belief. Not only is it not necessary for dialogue to believe that the religious
truth claims of another RCS are true in the same way that truths internal to one’s own RCS are, it
does not make sense to say that within internal pluralism. Within internal pluralism, the truth
claims of RCS2 are true internal to RCS2, and someone with RCS1 can recognize this level of
truth without taking the claims to be true in the same way that they take claims from RCS 1 to be
true. Perhaps an ethical insight could be gleaned from RCS2 such that it is incorporated into the
ethical metric by which RCS1 is evaluated and accomplished through different means amenable
to RCS1. But, it is still difficult for me to understand how claims from RCS2 could enter directly
into RCS1 such that they are considered to be the same kind of claim.
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And this makes sense with respect to my response to Davidson’s objection from
translatability. Leonard Swidler (1997), speaking about Knitter’s revisionary project, says that
“the mistake we must be cautious to avoid in this situation is that when we speak about the
transcendent we are using empirical language” and that we are intrinsically unable to do so (p.
188). In strictly literal terms, I would say we are in fact using the same language we use to
describe empirical concepts, but would agree in a less literal sense that we are not speaking
empirically. There is, as Davidson said, an ‘interdependence of belief and meaning’ in the
empirical realm, but this does not fully translate to the religious realm. And when Knitter says
that religious language is metaphoric, without denying that it involves real truth claims, he
indicates a sort of tension that I believe can be well accommodated within internal pluralism. It
is a way to systematically account for the paradoxical ‘relative absoluteness’ that undergirds
much of Knitter’s praxis-centric view. For despite this emphasis, Knitter seems more hesitant
than Hick to reduce religious belief to salvific efficacy completely, and this can account for that
anxiety. That is not to say that he ultimately does any less reduction that Hick, but he seems to
hesitate in a way that Hick does not.
It is also prima facie unclear how internal pluralism, even with the parallel ethical metric,
makes sense of the particularity problem. That is, how it can still be meaningful and rational to
adopt a particular religion over any other. This is above and beyond the rationality of adopting
any religion at all or the rationality of continuing to practice one’s religion in the face of
religious diversity. Internal pluralism has the rather counterintuitive feature of taking all
religions as at least minimally true intra-RCS but not inter-RCS, on which it is agnostic due to
the lack of a correspondence requirement. Granted, adherence requires more than belief, so an
RCS can be taken as correct in some sense without necessitating adherence. But nonetheless, the
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question remains of what motivates taking one religion over another. My answer is that it is
often cultural convenience with respect to the ‘birth lottery,’ although “‘cultural convenience’
does not accurately reflect the felt urgency of the choice and the resulting depth of commitment”
(Ruhmkorff, 2013, p. 21). I find that one is disposed to remain in their initial RCS, but not
necessitated. In minimum, one has a greater depth of understanding and subsequent greater
depth of religiosity in the religion one knows best. Even if two religions are intra-RCS equally
true, one will generally get more, so to speak, out of something they have practiced for ten years
than something they are just starting out with. Again, this is not necessitation; conversion and
abandonment are both perfectly compatible with this claim.
I accept that taking religious truth claims in this way has significant ramifications for
religious epistemology generally. And although religious epistemology is a significant and
important field, I find that as it stands it tends to primarily function properly only within a
particular RCS. Traditional modes of religious epistemology tend to include the same sorts of
faith justification bases and subsequent standstills as mentioned in the introduction and as such
do not do much to advance the interfaith conversation. Take for instance reports of mystical
experiences. It is much for likely for, say, a Muslim scholar to see a report of a Christian
mystic’s experience and situate it as an imperfect recognition of a revelation from Allah rather
than taking it as the reported vision from God, and vice versa. Internal realism can account for
this, but typical faith and revelation models cannot. In the broader context of pluralism I can
offer the unsatisfying claim that all we can really know is the as-if qualities of things like mystic
experience given my agnosticism on correspondence. So, within particular RCSs religious
epistemology can carry on as usual, but I do not think the traditional approach will gain much
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traction in the context of pluralism. Therefore, the radical shift in the understanding of religious
truth claims.
A final commentary on the relationship between idealized internal coherence and the
primary ethical metric. There are many cases in which there are beliefs and practices within a
religion that are ostensibly neutral with respect to well-being. I am perfectly okay with this and
find that in many cases those beliefs are very positive with respect to internal coherence under
ideal inquiry and help to resist the radical changes proposed by this paper. However, if there are
ostensibly harmful beliefs with respect to well-being, either internally to the that religion or
externally to another group, that have the same highly positive internal coherency profile, they
must nonetheless be discarded. The internal realist norms of this chapter must be secondary to
the ethical aims of chapter II.
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IV. Intradoctrinal Examination
In this chapter, I will be examining what a pluralist Christianity might look like after
intradoctrinal examination and revision in light of the salvific efficacy metric and the internal
pluralist conception of truth. I will be following Knitter, Driver, and Suchocki again, this time
looking at Christianity in particular. As such, this chapter will involve more Christian
metaphysical baggage than the previous chapters. I will first look at Knitter’s work on
understanding the salvific role of Jesus in a pluralist context as ‘one among many.’ I will then
turn to discussions of the deprioritization of the Holy Spirit in Western trinitarianism and its
effect on Christian thought. This will lead to a discussion of relationality and the cultural context
of value-basing communities in Driver and Suchocki. Driver places Spirit more centrally than
does Suchocki’s process-relational theology, but it is compatible with her work and there is
significant overlap in their discussions of community. I will end with Suchocki’s Christian
argument for pluralism generally as a direct result of God’s role in her process-relational picture.
It is an interesting point to end on, as it attacks the problem of religious diversity from within the
standpoint of the Christian RCS, rather than working from a minimal, universal sense of concrete
well-being to a culturally relativizable set of ethical standards as I did in the second chapter.

IV.i Knitter’s Five Theses on the Uniqueness of Jesus
One of Paul F. Knitter’s most important works is a book in which he lays out his proposal
for how best to understand Jesus in a pluralist context, and then has twenty philosophers respond.
I will introduce his theses and look at some of the more pertinent responses and objections.
Knitter’s (1997a) five theses are as follows:
1. Given the nature and history of Christology, previous understandings of the uniqueness
of Jesus can be reinterpreted.
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2. Given the ethical imperative of dialogue, previous understandings of the uniqueness of
Jesus must be reinterpreted.
3. The uniqueness of Jesus’s salvific role can be reinterpreted in terms of truly but not only.
4. The content of Jesus’s uniqueness must be made clear in Christian life and witness. This
content, however, will be understood and proclaimed differently in different contexts and
periods of history. Today, the uniqueness of Jesus can be found in his insistence that
salvation or the Reign of God must be realized in this world through human actions of
love and justice.
5. The orthodoxy of this pluralistic reinterpretation of the uniqueness of Jesus must be
grounded primarily in the ability of such a reinterpretation to nurture a holistic Christian
spirituality, that is, a devotion to and following of Jesus. The proposed understanding of
Jesus as God’s truly but not only saving word does meet this criterion (p. 3-16).
A central idea to hold in mind to understand Knitter’s proposal is the claim that Knitter (1997a)
is “not questioning whether Jesus is unique, only how” (p. 5). By extension, he is asking the
same question about the salvific role of Christianity, and that is what objectors seem to actually
be concerned about in these discussions. For one of the major worries is that to make Jesus one
among many is to reduce his role in salvation from a constitutive, ontological reality to mere
revelation of ethical ideas. That is to say, Jesus inspires salvation but does not effect salvation
himself. Though, Knitter can and does appeal here to the historical Roman theological concept
of ‘symbolizando causant.’ The concept is that “by symbolizing (teaching, showing), sacraments
cause or effect what they symbolize” (Knitter, 1997b, p. 156-7). So, to propose a sacramental
Christology is to make both a functional and an ontological claim about Jesus’s nature, not a
functional one at the expense of an ontological one.
But, before I deal with the fallout from Knitter’s reinterpretative project, let me give a
little more background and qualification for the theses themselves. In the first thesis, Knitter is
simply pointing to the shifts in Christology that have already occurred throughout the church’s
history as demonstration of the dynamic rather than static nature of the religion. He does
however, appeal to the value of “an ancient theological ground rule of the early communities”
that undertook these changes. That is that the “lex credendi (norms for belief) must resonate
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with and foster the lex orandi (norms for spirituality), but that such norms are dangerously
inadequate if they are not linked with the lex sequendi (norms for discipleship)” (Knitter, 1997a,
p. 5). So, despite Knitter’s susceptibility to the objection of reduction to the merely ethical and
his stressing of the necessity of discipleship, he nonetheless understands the importance of its
connections with belief and spirituality, albeit as a secondary concern. The latent existence of
this concern is part of the motivation for my inclusion of internal pluralism as a separate,
secondary coherency constraint, and part of why I find the dual metrics compatible. Though, it
is somewhat unclear why Knitter on one hand makes these distinctions, and on the other more or
less equates spirituality with discipleship in the fifth thesis.
In the second thesis, Knitter is appealing to two different ways in which the sufferings of
the world necessitate interreligious cooperation and reinterpretation: external and internal.
Externally, the existent eco-human suffering serves as a call to action. And internally, in order to
accomplish this, there must be a reprioritization of loving the neighbor over merely proclaiming
the gospel (Knitter, 1997a, p. 6). This thought will be later echoed by Suchocki’s (2003)
insistence that the Reign of God, understood as the enactment of this-worldly salvation, is “a
principle of unrest” that calls for the abandonment of existent values if such abandonment
achieves greater well-being. Specifically, the value reversal must culminate in the “exten[sion]
of well-being to those whom we neither require nor expect to become like ourselves” (p. 81-82).
This is in line with the historically Christian idea of truly judging the ethics of a community
based upon the way that ‘strangers in the gates’ are treated, rather than merely the way in which
members treat other members. It is only when one is concerned with the well-being of someone
that is not like them and likely never will be that one can see if that person is truly concerned
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with well-being as a primary aim rather than as, say, a means by which he could achieve
recognition and favor within his own community.
The third thesis introduces what is perhaps the most pernicious source of objection: his
carefully worded deflationary characterization of Jesus as one among many salvific avenues. He
is truly salvific but is not the only route to or source of salvation. Specifically, Knitter tries to
recharacterize God’s revelation in Jesus. The idea is that this revelation is universal, but not full.
The revelation can be used by all and can improve the lives of all, but is not exhaustive of God’s
truth. In this same vein, it cannot thus be said that Jesus’s revelation is definitive, in the sense
that no divine norms can exist outside of Jesus, or unsurpassable, in the sense that “God could
not reveal more of God’s fullness in other ways at other times” (Knitter, 1997a, p. 7-8). Rather,
Knitter offers decisive and indispensable to go along with universal. The revelation given in
Jesus is decisive in that it has normative power, but it does not restrict further norms. For, the
idea being, if God was to reveal further truth, it would not contradict these norms, only expand
them. Finally, that revelation is indispensable in that while it not per se required for others to
know or believe it, it would improve their lives if they did (Knitter, 1997a, p. 9-10). And the
sense of this improvement is borne out by Knitter’s response to a wonderful objection by Hick.
Hick warns that in claiming indispensability with respect to salvation, Knitter has merely arrived
at the old exclusivism by a highly roundabout path. He asks if Knitter means indispensable as in
the indispensability of penicillin or as in that of multivitamin tablets. In the latter sense, if
different brands of multivitamin tablets work more or less equally well, it cannot reasonably be
said that one of them is ‘indispensable’ (Hick, 1997, p. 82). Knitter (1997b) boils this objection
down to a dilemma: “if Christ is like penicillin, I’m an exclusivist missionary; if like vitamins,
I’m a missionary presenting a product that can be found elsewhere.” But the sense that Knitter
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has in mind is closer to a “skill or insight” such as reading and writing (p. 175-177). It is not as
if literacy is a necessary condition for living a contented life, but once one is literate they will be
forever changed and enriched by it. The idea here is that lessons learned from Christ are
universally additive and enriching but are not required to achieve the universal aims of this
project.
The fourth thesis makes clear liberation theology’s emphasis on the Reign of God as thisworldly salvation, defined as justice and love. This is in line with the second chapter’s
normative exercise and its prioritization over internal RCS standards. Knitter (1997a) actually
goes further and claims that this engagement with this-worldly concerns being so explicit and
central to Christianity “is the unique ingredient in [Jesus’s] saving message” (p. 13). Hick again
raises an objection to this point, denying even the possibility of organizing and understanding all
the pieces of a religion such that a distinct identity is made clear. And moreover, Christianity
isn’t even the only religion that does this (Knitter, 1997b, 162-163). Take for example this text
found in the Śrīmad Bhāgavatam: “Those who are devoted to the cause of the Personality of
Godhead live only for the welfare, development, and happiness of others” (Canto 1, Ch. 3, text
12). But Knitter (1997b) does not mean ‘unique’ as in ‘the only one,’ which is the first definition
offered in Webster’s dictionary, but as ‘distinctively characteristic,’ which is also offered by
Webster’s (p. 163). Moreover, he is not looking for an essence. Rather, he is only making the
claim that “an active commitment to this-worldly well-being is something without which one
wouldn’t have authentic Christian faith,” not that other religions are not so focused in varying
ways. And something similar is offered in a response by Kenneth Cragg in which he offers that
‘distinctive’ implies a difference that is intrinsically connected with the rest of a unity (Knitter,
1997b, p. 161). Knitter (1997b) also makes the claim that the preferential option for the victim is
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something distinctively characteristic of Christian historical engagement, although one must
understand this claim in something like Cragg’s sense (p. 170-171). It is unlikely that
Christianity is unique in this sort of engagement if ‘distinctive’ is understood as something true
of only Christianity.
In the last thesis, Knitter is claiming that his reinterpretation can be understood as
orthodox if the primacy of discipleship is granted for evaluation. That is to say, if orthodoxy is
grounded in praxis rather than in coherence with historical RCSs, then his reinterpretation is
orthodox. And Knitter defends this view against the objection that the focus on this-worldly
salvation comes at the cost of the more spiritual elements, notably mystic religious experience.
To this, Knitter concedes the ontological priority of the mystical, but denies that it is “always or
necessarily chronological.” Jon Sobrino suggests that mystical experience might actually be
found in the action, ‘contemplatio in actione’ (Knitter, 1997b, p. 167). And this is another way
to make sense of Gilkey’s ‘relativized absoluteness.’ In acting, one feels the basis for that acting
as absolute, but only as reflective in reflection. Perhaps the absoluteness is part of or correlated
with a praxis-centric sense of mystical experience. The idea would be that in acting on the basis
of a religious belief, in being motivated by a claim that in reflection cannot be claimed with
certainty, one feels the absoluteness and totality of the mystery underlying that belief and
becomes subsumed by it and completely and utterly devoted to it. This sounds like a mystical
sort of experience to me. This general view of devotion is in line with a Knitter discussion
elsewhere with respect to interpreting ostensibly absolutist biblical passages. In interpreting ‘one
and only’ claims, he suggests a “hermeneutic of discipleship.” Such claims’ truth is centrally in
calling one to discipleship rather than in religious definitions of Jesus situated within a wider
theoretical framework. Thus, these claims of ‘one and only’ are to be understood as full
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allegiance, “extolling [Jesus] as someone whose vision was entirely worthy of all one’s trust and
energies” (Knitter, 1997b, p. 149). This certainly seems rather far removed from the historical
understanding of Jesus. But, “historical knowledge by itself has no moral weight,” let alone
more than the primary ethical metric (Driver, 1981, p. 85). And if one accepts Knitter’s
grounding of orthodoxy in discipleship, with a secondary concern for normative concurrence
with spiritual norms when possible, then this is a justified interpretation. However, it is still a
radical interpretation. There will of course be controversy over what constitutes discipleship, but
broadly well-being oriented, religiously informed action is a widely compatible definition. I
believe that situating his claims within the relational and communal views of Driver and
Suchocki in section IV.iii will help to mitigate some of these concerns or at least provide further
grounding for their plausibility. Moreover, he seems to indicate being amenable to their ideas of
cultural and historical contexts being central to determining a religion’s identity in the fourth
thesis. But before I get to that, there remains some discussion to be had about reinterpreting the
role of the Holy Spirit and, to a lesser extent, of God.

IV.ii The Filioque Controversy and Trinitarianism
Driver and, to a smaller degree, Suchocki both base their community-centric relational
views in trinitarian thought, and Knitter also discusses the issue of a deprioritized Spirit. I find
that these discussions and proposed revisions in trinitarianism move the discussion more
historically orthodox rather than less, so it is my hope that this section will temper concerns
about the rather radical shift in the interpretations of Jesus’s salvific role. Moreover, it will be
useful to look at an internal kind of Christocentrism and its ill effects, as opposed to the external
Christocentrism of Christian exclusivism. The filioque clause is the source of the shift in
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trinitarian thinking in the West that I find to be detrimental in many cases. The controversy has
to do with the insertion of ‘filioque’ into the Nicene Creed. In the original text, the section that
lists beliefs about the Holy Spirit contained the line ‘Spiritum Sanctum…qui ex Patre procedit.’
A later council inserted ‘filioque’ after ‘Patre’ such that the text now said that the Spirit proceeds
from the Father and from the Son rather than merely from the Father. This was eventually
accepted by the Western church in the 11th century, which was a contributing factor to the schism
between Eastern and Western Christianity.
The main worry that comes out of this is that a filioque trinitarianism “run[s] the risk of a
form of ‘subordinationism,’ but this time not of the Word (or Son) to the Father (or Parent), but
of the Spirit to Word” (Knitter 1997b 180). This was further compounded by a linear
representation of the First, Second, and Third members of the Trinity, which at least runs against
the idea that no member has priority. Beyond the risk of subordinationism, these hierarchical
mischaracterizations led to God the Father alone being taken out of time. Rather than dynamic,
creative interaction with the world, as Driver and Suchocki will develop, God was removed
(Driver 1981 105-107). This is of course not to say that the insertion of the filioque clause was
the sole contributing factor to the removal of God from time or that it occurred overnight.
However, it most definitely helped to cement a growing interpretation of God as such. And such
an interpretation assists and is assisted by notions of historical biblicism, of God’s word as ‘once
and for all.’ Conversely, Driver’s (1981) “radical trinitarianism begins with God in relation to
creatures, not before” (p. 109).
At this point it will be useful to look at Driver’s conception of the Spirit within his radical
trinitarianism. For Driver (1981), “a doctrine of the Trinity requires two divine figures related in
a contextual field that is itself divine,” with the two figures having a “definite character” and an
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“ineffable” third component, the field itself (p. 105). This conception of the trinity is not of three
gods, nor of a static and removed God, but of a “changeful and complex” one. Instead, “Spirit is
that meaningful power of God’s life which is infinite and which resists figuration because its
function is to provide meaning and power to the figures we encounter” (Driver, 1981, p. 108109). The idea here is that Spirit is a sort of divine potential, the sense of possibilities not yet
actualized that are interpreted as Spirit. Because of the ineffable, indeterminate nature of Spirit,
it cannot determine ethical judgment, but informs it on the basis of the expectations generated by
the values of the community” (Driver, 1981, p. 113-115). And, as covered in II.iii, ‘expectancy’
is distinguished from mere hope via its relationship to present action. The central claim of
Driver’s (1981) radical trinitarianism with respect to the Spirit is that “Spirit is concomitant with
passionate interest in present reality in the context of infinite Spirit,” which is directly in line
with liberation theology’s this-worldly focus (p. 111). It is worth pointing out that such a
conception of Spirit appears to be an impersonal one. It is in minimum indeterminate in
isolation, in that Spirit itself does not provide the contentful specifics of the reality that it helps to
manifest. Instead, it is mere potential. The specifics of what becomes actualized are based in the
expectant values of a given community rather than in, say, the aims and goals of Spirit itself. I
think it is reasonable to say that Spirit is broadly positive in its directionality, but since it and the
expectant value set with which it interacts is based in part upon the past history of that
community, this contextualized nature could make it so that what is actualized is bent slightly
towards the past mistakes and persistent ills of that community.
Knitter also presents a conception of the Trinity in light of the worry of subordinationism,
and many of his claims echo Driver. Here as well, there is concern that the independent, though
related, “dynamism and historicity” of the Spirit is conflated with that of the Word. He follows
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George Khodr’s proposal that the two economies cannot be understood in isolation but exist in
“hypostatic independence.” A benefit of this is that the truths revealed by one economy by be
more revealing in some form or fashion but will not contradict those revealed by the other
because of the reciprocity and mutual service of their relations (Knitter, 1997b, p. 181).
However, where Driver, though never explicitly, seems to reject the filioque clause
entirely, Knitter proposes what he considers a non-subordinating conception of a filioque
trinitarianism. He claims that “the economy of the Spirit is a consequence of the incarnation,
originating from it (filioque), but living out its own identity (its own hypostasis)” (Knitter,
1997b, p. 181). I am not entirely convinced, however. This seems to be just reinforcement of a
deep ontological priority of the Word over Spirit. The filioque clause, among other reasons,
opens the door to the deleterious effects of removing God from time and subordinating Spirit.
And this internal sense of christocentrism will only impede liberation theology generally, as
“Christian community is only a social hierarchy rather than a communitas “to the extent that [it]
focuses on a central figure” (Driver, 1981, p. 168).
It can of course by argued that Spirit is subordinate to Word with or without the filioque
clause. However, understanding Spirit in Driver’s sense is such that the particular way in which
the Word was revealed to us in the particular instantiation of the Son is in part constituted by the
Spirit. That is to say, the Son is actualized within the field of divine potential that is Spirit and
which is informed by the communal expectations of the Christian community at that time. The
way that the significance of the Son is understood is in part based upon its meaning and power
being based in the figurating power of Spirit. So, I resist the claim that Spirit is inherently
subordinate because it is a constitutive component of the Word thought of as an actualization of
God’s will from divine potential to reality. This sort of conception is far closer to the traditional
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relationality of ‘one in three,’ though God still seems primary if any member is. Regardless,
such a conception is better suited to develop a dynamic, expectant Christianity and better reflects
the initial framing by the Nicene Creed.

IV.iii Communities and Relationality
Suchocki and Driver both place relations within and among communities as fundamental
features of their theologies. In fact, Suchocki even bases this in trinitarianism. The idea is that if
“the nature of God [is] a depth of unity that is established in and through irreducible diversity,”
as trinitarianism proclaims, then an individual alone cannot truly be in the image of God
(Suchocki, 2003, p. 66). Rather, the community is required to reflect this diversity. And this is
not to say that the individual does have a role or is not godly. It only means that the locus of the
image of God is in the community, as is the generation of ethical values and so forth.
The central aim of this section is to look at what kind of community should be the ideal
basis for the generation of the culturally relativized ethical values that determine their RCSspecific ethical metric. For both Suchocki and Driver, these communities are inherently and
dynamically interrelated. Like religion itself through history, the values of the community shift
and change with their context. In fact, these shifts in values determine the shifts in theology.
And this is not a radical claim. People already regularly self-determine varying levels of
authority for different parts of the Bible, “yet we rarely confess that we are doing so” (Driver,
1981, p. 94). But at the same time, these shifts can be monumental for the identity and felt
experience of religious practitioners. And this is the point of including internal pluralist as a
conservatist inclination, in an attempt to echo those theological ground rules of the early
Christian community. Specifically, this provides a way to approach well-being neutral beliefs
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and practices. I lean towards them being left alone for the sake of (non-harmful) historical
coherence, when possible. A hypothetical religion that produced zero helpful or harmful outputs
could and should probably do more, but a religion that is focused on this-worldly salvation could
probably keep some harmless beliefs and practices. There are also cases of religious practices
such as asceticism that ostensibly provide a reduction in well-being, but such self-inflicted base
‘suffering’ is typically done by people who have established well-being in the higher two senses
of Suchocki’s. Without even getting into the liberty of the individual versus inflicting suffering
upon others, such practices often deepen religiosity and would also ultimately provide more
benefit than harm in most cases. Not to say that it ought to be mandatory, of course.
Both Driver and Suchocki view relationality as a fundamental feature of existence itself.
For Driver (1981), “things are and are known in relation to each other” such that knowledge is
constituted by “our interpretations of changing relations among” both the related figures and the
necessary context itself (p. 96, 104). For Suchocki’s (2003) process-relational theology, these
relationships are central to identity as well, in that “who we are depends upon our own individual
creative responses to physical and psychical relationships” (p. 25). For both, God is directly
involved in these same sorts of dynamic relationships. And such a feature is the bedrock of even
ethics generally, as “ethical decisions and values do not focus on whether people should be
related but on the mode and quality of their interactions” (Driver, 1981, p. 146). It already
assumes the existence of those interactions as fundamental.
Here it is necessary to give an explication of the ‘process’ half of Suchocki’s processrelational theology. Process theology operates under a call and response system. God sets the
initial parameters and “as the world responds within those parameters, it increasingly participates
in determining its own content.” And these responses are actively evaluated and responded to by
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God, building upon the past history and past responses of that community, whether they be good
or bad (Suchocki, 2003, p. 29-30). The call that God makes is a call to greater care in and for the
community and to “forms of community that mediate well-being” relativized to the cultural
context (Suchocki, 2003, p. 34). The important thing to note here is that there is an inherent
capacity for novelty in the responses of both God and the world such that the ideal form to which
God calls community towards will vary based on the past responses of that community. The call
is one that is suitable for that particular time and place (Suchocki, 2003, p. 47). And Driver
(1981) echoes this in saying that “the relation of Christ to human society is dependent upon what
transpires in the koinonia (communal life) of Christians” (p. 165). In such a system, the truth of
each RCS is constituted in that RCS as well as its cultural context (Suchocki, 2003, p. 45-47).
This grounding in cultural context is likely wholly through the history of the value judgments of
that community, although place-bound religions are more directly theologically based in physical
contexts.

IV.iv Process-Relational Theology and Pluralism Generally
Suchocki’s system also provides an interesting argument for the validity of a plurality of
religions from within a Christian RCS. It starts from the claim that to the degree to which a
revelation is exclusive, it is weakened. This is the idea that the fewer people that are saved
because of it, in a this-worldly sense or not, the less effective the revelation. Note the difference
between this view and the typical view of a unique source of revelatory knowledge. Rather, in
call and response, God adapts revelation to the contextualized community, and it is “because [of
this adaptation] that each form of revelation is of inestimable importance” (Suchocki, 2003, p.
104). And given the capacity for novelty in the responses of both God and the world, the set of
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responses and subsequent RCSs is necessarily diverse and, moreover, there are necessarily at
least some revelational truths in other religions. And if there’s no good way to determine what is
and is not revelation, outside of merely ethical metrics, it is necessary that each RCS is given
initial equal rights in dialogue. And interesting benefit of this Christian argument for pluralism
is that it goes against the intuitive idea that pluralism intrinsically exists in opposition to one’s
RCS.
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V. Conclusion
This project has attempted to show that despite the existence of a plurality of prima facie
incompatible RCSs, there is nonetheless a universal thread underlying that plurality. This
common thread is the shared belief that suffering is generally bad and increases in well-being are
generally good. This universal thread exists at a level deeper than religions themselves and thus
avoids becoming a distillation of religion to a shared essence. Rather, it is a shared feature of
existence broadly. Of course, visions of what constitutes well-being vary widely based upon
relativized visions of how the world ought to be, and there is subsequent variation in richer
senses of well-being between different contexts. Nonetheless, it is this shared thread that is then
relativized outwards. Keeping hold of this broad aim as the primary metric by which a religion
is evaluated helps to mitigate wholesale religious relativism.
In sharing this common aim, we can take divergent attempts at realizing divergent
versions of that aim seriously and as legitimate and potentially instructive. Moreover, we can
view the aims and practices as potentially instructive without having to adopt the views of the
RCS underlying them. The way in which this is achieved is by taking the claims of another RCS
as legitimate truth claims. This is both necessary for dialogue broadly and a necessary result of
the lack of MR verifiability. Granted, the lack of a correspondence constraint on truth claims is a
radical shift, but such a shift is necessary if one is not content with the pluralist standstill. And
constructing a framework that is based in idealized inquiry rather than mere coherency helps to
mitigate specific belief relativism.
The framework constructed is one by which the ethical outputs of religiously motivated
praxis can be evaluated independently of the truth of the metaphysical claims underlying and
adjacent to that praxis, which cannot be evaluated satisfactorily. It is also one by which we can
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take seriously the religious truth claims of our and other RCSs despite the lack of
correspondence verifiability. Moreover, taking them seriously in this sense helps to maintain the
felt experience of members of all of the RCSs. This includes one’s own, as in discarding
exclusivism and accepting pluralism broadly, one’s own RCS runs the risk of seeming less
legitimate in the same way that others appeared less legitimate to an exclusivist.
And situating one’s own RCS within this context can be helpful in reconceptualizing it in
light of the practical aims of this project. Take the example case of Christianity. Not only are
we able to maintain more of the felt experience than seems initially possible, a surprising amount
of that maintenance can be achieved by more orthodox means than one might anticipate. Take
for example the concept of symbolizando causant. The extreme fear about what the salvific role
of the Church becomes if Christ does not constitute salvation in the exclusivist or inclusivist
sense is not only less of an issue than it appears, but it can also be rectified by the application of
a historically Christian theological concept, rather than only be means of a roundabout and
counterintuitive pluralist invention. Similarly, the hermeneutic of discipleship and Gilkey’s
relative absoluteness can make sense of prima facie absolute truth claims by understanding them
as claims about deep discipleship and devotion, central features of New Testament Christianity.
And the way in which these concepts make sense of the lack of verifiability is ultimately not
very far removed from the typical Christian ideas of action motivated by faith, at least
evidentially. Acting upon a belief held in faith as if it were absolutely true is not particularly
different from acting as if a belief you cannot verify or adequately defend as exclusively true in
reflection as absolute when acting on the basis of that belief. And even if the reader does not
reject the filioque clause, the mere existence of the controversy shows that religions have been
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self-examining at a foundational, metaphysical level for hundreds of years, above and beyond
shifts in emphasized doctrine based on communal value shifts.
That being said, it is clear to me that my project nevertheless demands a radical shift in
the self-understanding of a given practitioner. But I find this radical shift to be a necessary one if
the pluralist standstill that began this paper is accepted as a legitimate threat. The response to
that standstill offered has been a careful agnosticism with respect to the MR claims that make up
the cosmological background of a given religion. But within that agnosticism, which is more of
a recognition of unverifiability than it is a denial of the truth claims involved, this project offers a
way to nonetheless progress as a religion in its aims and the achievement thereof.
I concede that there are several aspects of pluralist religious practice that cannot wholly
adequately be taken into account by the framework offered by this project. It can account for
learning from the general aims of other RCSs and incorporating those aims into one’s own and
achieving them via a different avenue that is more coherent with one’s own RCS. But it has
trouble making sense of claimed dual belonging by pluralists such as Knitter. Nevertheless, truly
dual practitioners, as opposed to, say, a Buddhist-informed Christian, are more the exception
than they are the rule. As such, for the average religious practitioner, even finding a way in
which they can learn from and be bettered by the claims and beliefs of another religion without
feeling as if the simple recognition of value in another RCS is a threat to one’s own is a
significant step in the right direction.
And there is of course the possibility that there is indeed only one true religion. This is
particularly troubling as it would be the case that it is merely the so-called ‘birth lottery’ that
determines whether or not one is a member of the ‘correct’ faith. But given that we have no way
by which to justifiably determine which of the various religions is in fact true if this were the
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case, I do not find that this logical possibility undermines this project. It is still the case that we
cannot know, it is still the case that we as existent beings share the common aims of reducing
suffering and increasing well-being, and it is still the case that each religion, in its own way,
seeks to achieve these aims as part and parcel of its vision for the world. Thereby, such a logical
possibility does not mitigate the practical rationality of continued religions practice in the way
that this paper has laid out.
There has also been in the background of this paper the base assumption that religiosity is
in and of itself intrinsically valuable or at least potentially positive. And in most cases I would
take this to be true. But there is the logical possibility, if not probability, that in at least some
cases “a person’s cultural or religions community is an inherent obstacle” to the achievement of
a this-wordly salvation, an obstacle to the Reign of God understood as an establishment of a thiswordly salvific Kingdom. Such a situation has been termed by some in the pluralist community
as “an instance of the ‘anti-Kingdom’” and in such cases it would seem the appropriate
dialogical stance would be to try and get a given practitioner to abandon their particular RCS
(Knitter, 1997b, p. 179). This could be found in particularly repressive and fundamentalist sects
of a given religion. I would hesitate to say that there is a religion that is wholesale an instance of
the anti-Kingdom, but that remains logically possible. If it is indeed the case that a religion as a
whole was found to be an obstacle to well-being, rather than a religion particularized in an
unfortunate manner, then hard questions would emerge for this project as a whole. It would be
difficult to draw a hard line by which to evaluate a religion as being wholly harmful, as
mentioned earlier in the comparison of ranking religions as totalities to utilitarian calculus at the
fine-grained level.
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The background question of the value of religiosity has also been in the context of
humanism. Humanism seems to be in good standing in terms of achieving the universal aims of
reducing suffering and increasing well-being, even more so if pluralism is without an internal
metric such as Harrison’s internal pluralism to mitigate specific belief relativism. If either
radical relativism or specific belief relativism is true, then religions can quite easily become a
hinderance to those ethical aims rather than an aid. For the former, there need not even be a
concern for ethical aims within religions. And for the latter, religions become a roundabout way
of achieving something that can be more efficiently achieved secularly. It may well be the case
that until more religious communities undergo something approaching the self-evaluation and
interfaith dialogue proposed by this paper, humanism is a better way of achieving the ethical
aims of the second chapter. That being said, I resist the idea that this is necessarily true, or will
remain true after such self-evaluation and reprioritization. I hold the view that religion is a
sufficient but not necessary motivation for achieving those ends, and welcome humanists’
participation. But I do also believe that religiosity has its own separate value that is worth
maintaining as best as possible. Simply because this paper set aside metaphysical and
cosmological claims due to insolubility in MR terms does not mean that I do not find religion a
beautiful and valuable way of communing with the divine and reveling in Mystery. If anything,
the agnosticism of this paper, in the literal sense of being unable to know with certainty, is in my
view a far more interesting stance than if it were in fact possible to adjudicate metaphysical
disputes via MR.
If nothing else, this paper has sought to demonstrate the mere possibility of being able to
both take the threat of pluralism seriously and not only be able to continue practicing one’s
religion with practical rationality and without dissonance, but also improve the manner in which
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the religion is being practiced, given the context of pluralism. Rather than either ignoring
pluralism or reducing religion to merely salvific outputs, this paper seeks a third way in which
pluralism can not only be recognized without a total loss of felt experience but can also be a
possible source of growth. The secondary internal truth metric helps to keep the religion as close
as is possible to the way it has existed despite the changes required from the primacy of praxis
and provides a better way in which the claims of other religions can be understood and learned
from. The primary salvific efficacy metric helps to move religions forward towards achieving
the aims that we can work towards that can in fact be evaluated.
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